A/HRC/45/9 serves to dehumanize them, and thereby to legitimize State policies to “combat” so-called “illegal” migration, which is framed as an inherent threat to sovereignty and national security. This process of dehumanization is exacerbated by the shift towards the use of drones and the push towards automation. 44. Moreover, the use of drones in maritime surveillance enables States and regional organizations to focus on detection and to distance themselves from search and rescue operations that may result in migrants reaching safe harbours. Reports suggest that information gathered by drones and other air assets used in surveillance operations by countries of destination has been sent to coastguards in countries of transit so that the latter conducts the rescue operations in lieu of the former, resulting in returns of migrants to the country of transit. This has included return to a country of transit where migrants are at serious risk of arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and other forms of abuse. 34 45. These surveillance tools also play an instrumental role in changing migration routes away from detectable areas and into those that are beyond the range of the surveillance equipment. Thus, migrants are compelled to take less direct and more dangerous routes, increasing the physical difficulty of the movement and the physiological and mental toll, pain and suffering that results frequently in death due to heat stroke, severe dehydration and other illnesses on migration journeys by water or land. In addition, migrants are forced to rely increasingly on smugglers to successfully navigate ever more difficult routes. Not only does this often raise the financial costs of their journey, it can also expose the migrants to a higher risk of abuse, such as trafficking by organized criminal groups, sexual violence and death. C. Immigration detention, returns and removals 1. Immigration detention 46. In recent decades, privatized immigration detention has developed in an increasing number of countries of destination. The privatized immigration detention market is worth billions of dollars across just a handful of these countries, in which companies own, construct, manage, and/or operate detention facilities for irregular or undocumented migrants. 47. In 2017, the Working Group published a report on privatized places of detention (A/72/286), in which it raised concerns about the appalling conditions in immigration detention centres. It highlighted the mistreatment of migrants by company personnel, manifesting at times in sexual violence, deaths in custody, the use of solitary confinement as punishment, and other serious human rights abuses. Other concerns were lack of adequate physical and mental health care of detainees, economic exploitation, restrictions on religious freedom, and lack of access to legal representation and other due process violations. In light of these concerns, and of the risks to respect for human rights generated by outsourcing services relating to the deprivation of liberty, the Working Group called on States to terminate the practice of outsourcing the overall operation of immigration detention facilities to private security companies. 48. These calls have gone unheeded. Some three years later, the Working Group continues to receive credible reports demonstrating that serious human rights abuses continue to occur, or in some cases, that conditions in these facilities have deteriorated further. In countries that outsource the overall operation of immigration detention centres to private security companies, there are persistent and widespread reports of abuse by company personnel. 49. The COVID-19 pandemic confirmed the glaring shortcomings of the systems in place and reinforced the need for prompt action to address the concerns raised in the Working Group’s 2017 report and by other United Nations human rights mechanisms. 35 The appalling conditions of many of these centres meant that they were seriously ill34 35 See ITA 4/2017. See also https://c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_e0466b7845f941098730900ede1b51cb.pdf; and https://statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf. See, for example, USA 18/2018, OTH 60/2018 and OTH 61/2018. 11