A/HRC/45/9 the industry operates (see para. 23 above) creates a multiplicity of actors and a lack of clarity regarding parent companies, subsidiaries and subcontractors, with regularly changing parameters, such that information gathered about a company and its specific activities may be quickly outdated. This means that basic information, such as which company is providing which service, for how long, for what purpose, and at what cost, is elusive.48 Access issues also arise in immigration detention settings and privately managed zones at airports, where access to detained migrants is often restricted. This is exacerbated by the remote or inaccessible location of many detention facilities, and even more stark in the case of offshore detention centres. 63. The lack of available and accessible information impedes efforts by media outlets and non-governmental organizations to monitor these operations effectively. One way to seek to overcome this has been through freedom of information requests to Governments, although not to private companies, in those countries with enabling legislation. Those who have availed of this mechanism, however, found it to be onerous and inconclusive as information released is not comprehensive, at times severely lacking, and often released only after long delays. For example, it reportedly took a year and a half, and the filing of a lawsuit, to obtain relevant information from the Government concerned in response to a freedom of information request by a non-governmental organization enquiring about the causes of death of a man who died in custody in an immigration detention centre. 49 Delays of this kind, when related to cases of human rights violations and abuses, have a profound impact on the right of victims and their families to the truth. B. Oversight and accountability 64. Oversight and accountability for actions by private military and security companies is notoriously weak.50 The lack of transparency and access to information, coupled with the complex corporate structures described above also complicate efforts to define responsibilities, liability and accountability. 65. In general, States outsource specific aspects of immigration detention and border control to private actors while retaining control and decision-making powers over the overall border management apparatus. Moreover, private actors often operate alongside State security and other officials. It is often difficult to determine the division of labour between private and public actors and to ascribe actions and decisions to specific entities and individuals. This facilitates attempts by the various actors to absolve themselves of their responsibilities. 66. Moreover, even when abuse of migrants’ rights has been exposed, there are few, if any, repercussions for the company and individual personnel responsible. Rather, States have frequently renewed or expanded contracts with companies with a long record of human rights abuses, for example in immigration detention. At times, one company is replaced by another, regardless of its track record on human rights. Even in those instances in which a company has lost its contract, it did not lose its share of the market, but was hired for other contracts. 67. Some mechanisms and strategies are, however, being pursued in an attempt to address abuses, notably those occurring in immigration detention centres and during deportations. National oversight mechanisms in the form of government inspectorates, national preventive mechanisms mandated to conduct visits to places where persons are deprived of liberty under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, and ombudspersons are active in monitoring immigration detention facilities in some countries. In one country, for example, a government inspectorate monitors privately run immigration detention facilities. Recent findings from four unannounced inspection visits include: egregious violations of national immigration detention standards and of contractual requirements and risks thereof; inadequate follow-up to previously identified shortcomings; 48 49 50 See submission by the Center for International Human Rights of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. See https://aclu-co.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACLU_CO_Cashing_In_On_Cruelty_09-1719.pdf. See A/HRC/36/47. 15