A/HRC/15/46 71. There should be a separate and independent office of the Prosecutor General with powers to supervise prosecutors at all levels and all prosecutors should belong to an independent office rather than be simply attached to the courts concerned. Reform of the composition of the Supreme Council of Magistracy 72. The Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) should be amended to make it a truly independent body. The existing law already accepts the principle that members of the SCM can be judges and prosecutors elected by their peers from among their number. This principle should be extended to allow all members (with the exception of the King) to be elected from among the highest ranks in the judiciary, from retired senior judges or from among distinguished professors of law. This would reinforce the independence of the judiciary by removing the current elements of executive control and would introduce a democratic and transparent procedure for selecting and appointing members. Three out of nine members of the SCM are supposed to be elected by the judges; however the election has not taken place and the executive has been making such appointments instead, so there are reasons to question the current composition of the SCM. Furthermore, the current composition, especially the presence of six ex-officio members out of nine, is not conducive to effective and independent functioning of the Council. Nor is the provision of appointing the president of the Court of Appeal or the General Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal. This is because these middle-level judicial officials may have to take decisions relating to the appointment of the judges of a higher level court, i.e. the Supreme Court, or take disciplinary action against the members of the judiciary who are senior to them. This state of affairs puts the President of the Court of Appeal and the General Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal in an uncomfortable position and their effectiveness and independence may be compromised. 73. Members of the SCM should cease to be active judges whilst they are in office and should not be members of any political party. There are three reasons why this proposal makes sense. Firstly, it lessens the potential conflict of interest between the duties of an SCM member and the activities of a judge active in a court. Secondly, it allows the member to concentrate full-time on the responsibilities of the SCM without the distraction of his or her normal court work. SCM members should be given tenure for a specific term, perhaps renewable once, and for the duration of this tenure in the SCM, the member should stand outside the routine court system. Thirdly, they would be able to discharge their responsibilities fairly and independently and in a non-partisan manner. 74. A number of positions on the Council should be reserved for women. This proposal is in line with Cambodia’s responsibilities under the CEDAW. In addition, the Law on the SCM should contain an explicit duty for the Council to promote the appointment and promotion of competent and qualified women judges and prosecutors. Reform of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of Magistracy 75. The Supreme Council of Magistracy should have its own secretariat headed by a senior judge appointed by the King or by the Council itself and not by the Minister of Justice. The reformed SCM should include a professional secretariat under the direct supervision of the members of the SCM. A strengthened secretariat, coupled 17