A/HRC/39/49 various reasons, children have no or limited access to information concerning the consequences of their choice; they neither control nor fully comprehend the structures and forces that they are dealing with; they have little knowledge and understanding of the medium- and long-term consequences of their actions. 10 Furthermore, children are often drugged or submitted to a process of “brainwashing” in order to control them. Research shows that the difficulty of maintaining neutrality in conflict areas also creates incentives for children to join armed groups, especially when there is no benefit to maintaining neutrality because even those who try to remain neutral are perceived by others as aligning with one side or the other.11 33. In the present report, the Working Group focuses on the economic and material motivations of the recruitment of children by non-State armed groups. From the perspective of non-State armed groups, children are not only recruited as substitutes for adults, but sometimes have comparative advantages over them. The rationale behind the choice of child recruits generally lies in the assumption that, owing to their young age and immaturity, children can be easily intimidated, manipulated and indoctrinated. They tend to listen to the commanders and follow their orders without questioning them. In addition, children are also seen as less costly than adult recruits, because they receive fewer resources and less equipment. Children are seen as cheap labour because they are willing to work for lower wages than adults, and they are usually too young to have dependents — spouses and children — for whom some non-State armed groups provide additional benefits. For example, even though ISIL generally pays the same salary to adult fighters and those under 18 years, adult fighters receive an additional stipend for spouses and children, and sometimes housing for their families.12 34. Many armed groups take advantage of the poverty and financial insecurity of the populations affected by armed conflicts to attempt to recruit young children. Their offers seem tempting for poor children who live in an environment of high insecurity. For example, children fighting with ISIL are reportedly paid like adults (see A/68/878, para. 145). In the Syrian Arab Republic, many children continue to be recruited by non-State armed groups for modest salaries to support their families. The promised monthly salary is an incentive for impoverished families to agree to the recruitment. In Al-Bab, Aleppo, ISIL offers between $100 and $150 monthly to young men and boys, some only 14 years old, if they join (see A/HRC/33/55, para. 117). A former combatant of the Free Syrian Army and Jhabat Al-Nusra indicated in an interview that he had joined the FSA at the age of 14 years and later switched sides to Jhabat Al-Nusra because it was the highest-paying armed group in his area. He stated that he did not care about the ideology of either group and it was always just a matter of business. According to this former combatant, many parents encouraged their children to attend the Jhabat Al-Nusra indoctrination courses in order to obtain the free food that the group provided for students. Some of the students went on to enlist as fighters just because they wanted food and money.13 Children living in towns and villages without access to education are disproportionately vulnerable to recruitment. Some child soldiers are even recruited by non-State armed groups from refugee camps in neighbouring countries. In this context, economic incentives also contribute to the recruitment of these children. 35. The Working Group stresses that the incentives for children to be associated with non-State armed groups may also go beyond monetary rewards. Some groups seek to recruit local or foreign children or entire foreign families by providing food, goods, 10 11 12 13 Elisabeth Schauer and Thomas Elbert, “The psychological impact of child soldiering”, in Trauma Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, Erin Martz, ed. (New York, Springer-Verlag, 2010), pp. 311– 360. Siobhan O’Neil, “Trajectories of children into and out of non-State armed groups”, in O’Neil and Van Broeckhoven, Cradled by Conflict; Revkin, “I am nothing without a weapon”; Hilary Matfess, Graeme Blair and Chad Hazlett, “Beset on all sides: children and the landscape of conflict in North East Nigeria”, in O’Neil and Van Broeckhoven, Cradled by Conflict; Drumbl and Rona, “Navigating challenges in child protection”. Revkin, “I am nothing without a weapon”. Ibid. 9