A/HRC/28/38 that standards for the respect of international law should not be lowered in the fight against terrorism, while another stated that the gruesome activities of terrorists should not blind States to their human rights obligations. 37. Many delegations expressed concern that armed drones had been used outside the international legal framework. Some expressed specific concerns that drone strikes could amount to extrajudicial or arbitrary executions or, depending on the context, war crimes. It was recalled that outside armed conflict, the key international framework was international human rights law and some delegations recalled that international law prohibited arbitrary and extrajudicial executions as a violation of the most fundamental right to life. Some suggested that targeted killings could almost never be legal, either under international human rights law, because of the strict conditions for the use of force, or under international humanitarian law, because the killing of an individual could never be considered as the only goal of a military operation. Some reiterated concerns over the practices of “signature strikes” and “secondary strikes” aimed at those rescuing the victims of the first drone strike, while others noted the disproportionate impact of drone strikes on individuals, including women and children. 38. In response to a question on the international standards for the use of lethal force outside armed conflict, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions reiterated that the use of lethal force might be lawful under international human rights law in a limited set of very exceptional situations, where there was absolute necessity and an imminent threat. The Director of International Law and Protection Programmes at the International Commission of Jurists noted that the principle of proportionality required a graduated response, both in the context of law enforcement and in the context of noninternational armed conflicts. In the context of law enforcement, the use of lethal force was lawful only if it was strictly and directly necessary to save lives. Proportionality required an examination as to whether other measures could be employed to protect the threatened person, while necessity required an examination as to whether some lesser degree of force could be employed, such as the use of warnings, restraint, or capture.9 39. Some speakers noted that international humanitarian law and international human rights law were principally aimed at protecting human life and that international human rights law was applicable to everyone within the jurisdiction of a State in both times of peace and of armed conflict. In that regard, one delegation expressed the view that in a time of armed conflict, international humanitarian law constituted lex specialis. In relation to one speaker’s comment about the extraterritorial use of drones, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism recalled that article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights required each State party to respect and ensure to all persons subject to its jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Covenant without any distinction of any kind. Guided by the principle that a State cannot avoid its international human rights obligations by taking action outside its territory which it would be prohibited from taking at home, State parties were required to respect and ensure the rights laid down in the covenant to anyone within their power or effective control, even if not situated within the territory of a State party.10 He noted that States could not avoid their human rights responsibilities simply by refraining from bringing some powers within the bounds of the law, as this would undermine both the 9 10 12 See also ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (adopted by the Assembly of ICRC on 26 February 2009) and CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 15. See Human Rights Committee general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant.