A/HRC/24/30 reduce the scope of missile and rocket launchings towards Israel”. Various precautions were reportedly taken in the attack, and it was stated that operations staff had not foreseen the civilian harm that resulted. However, even if one member of the Al-Dalou family was affiliated with an armed group, it would appear that the attack would not have met the legal requirement of proportionality in light of the fact that the other 11 persons killed were civilians. Given that the house, located in a residential area of Gaza City, totally collapsed, and numerous adjacent houses sustained damage, it is difficult to understand how the extent of civilian harm could not have been foreseen. If it could not have been foreseen for lack of sufficient information on the extent of civilian presence, the attack should not have been carried out. The lack of clarity regarding the compliance of the attack with international law would appear to require that an investigation be carried out. 9. There are concerns regarding the ability of Palestinians to seek redress for harm suffered as a result of Israeli military operations. Palestinians face a myriad of procedural requirements and legal obstacles that are effectively insurmountable, including unreasonable time limits imposed on accessing the civil court system for compensation, high fees for court guarantees and impracticable procedural requirements related to power of attorney from Gazan clients to Israeli lawyers. Further, recent legislative developments have widely expanded an exemption in liability afforded to the State of Israel for “an act done in the course of a military operation by the IDF”.9 B. Restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities on the civilian population in Gaza 1. Blockade 10. The movement of Palestinians out of Gaza and access to basic utilities, housing, education, work, health and an adequate standard of living continued to be severely restricted due to Israel’s blockade. The unemployment rate remained one of the highest in the world, with 32.2 per cent of Gaza’s workforce unemployed.10 Despite the easing of the blockade following the ceasefire understanding,11 Gaza’s imports remained significantly short of pre-2007 levels. In February 2013, Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)12 announced measures regarding the movement of goods to Gaza,13 and in December 2012, Israel and Egypt lessened certain restrictions on importing construction materials.14 Israel allowed a daily quota of 20 truckloads of aggregates for use by the commercial sector. This amounts to about 15 per cent of the estimated need. Egypt permitted the entry of construction materials for Qatar-funded projects through the Rafah crossing. Although important, these measures remained insufficient given the limited volumes and materials allowed through the crossings. 15 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Update on accountability for violations of international law during the escalation of hostilities in Gaza and southern Israel between 14 and 21 November 2012, OHCHR, 21 May 2013. In February 2013, the Israeli Southern Central Court in Be’er Sheva dismissed 15 civil cases field by Gazan human rights organizations, a major setback to the right of victims to access justice and remedy. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_LFSQ42012E.pdf For the consequences of the escalation in hostilities on the Palestinian population of Gaza, see A/HRC/22/35 and A/HRC/22/35/Add.1. COGAT is Israel’s body responsible for implementing its policy vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip. http://www.cogat.idf.il/901-10767-en/Cogat.aspx Since June 2010, import of construction materials was limited to international organizations implementing projects pre-approved by Israel (and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah), see http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2013_01_28_english.pdf. Ibid. 5