A/HRC/17/28* matter of utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities.” 46. At the regional level, the African, Inter-American and Arab instruments, recognize protection against “arbitrary” deprivation of life, 19 while the European Convention is based on “intention.” Article 2.1 of the European Convention states that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.” 47. With regard to deprivation of life, article 2.2 of the European Convention states as follows: Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 48. The test for the use of force in the European system, including when dispersing a riot, is whether it is “absolutely necessary.” 20 The use of force must be both proportionate and necessary. 49. While “proportionality” requires that the benefits attached to the objective pursued should outweigh the damage that would be caused through the violence, “necessity” demands that the lowest possible level of force necessary to achieve a legitimate objective should be used. 21 50. Article 2.2 of the European Convention therefore provides for three contexts in which deprivation of life caused by use of force does not engage State responsibility: selfdefence, arrest or riots. These contexts probably constitute the sum total of instances in which killing would be considered non-arbitrary under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 22 51. The right to life, as defined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is not subject to the internal limitation clauses that can be evoked in respect of many other rights. However, it is not an absolute right because non-arbitrary deprivation of life is regarded as acceptable. 52. No derogation from the right to life is permissible under the International Covenant. 23 19 20 21 22 23 10 African Charter, art. 4; American Convention, art. 4; Arab Charter, art. 5. See McCann and Others v. United Kingdom , ECHR 1898/91 (27 September 1995). See A/61/311, paras. 40-45; also Suárez de Guerrero v. Colombia, No. R.11/45 (A/37/40); Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, No. 859/1999 (CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999); Güll v. Turkey, ECHR 2267/931 (4 December 2000); Zambrano-Vélez and others v. Ecuador I/A Court H.R. Series C No.166 (2007); Neira Alegria v. Peru I/A Court H.R. Series C No. 20 (1995); contrast Kelly v. United Kingdom [1993] ECHR 17579/90 (13 January 1993). See Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see para. 34, fn. 9), p. 128. ICCPR, art. 4; see also American Convention, art. 27; European Convention, art. 15; Arab Charter, art. 4(2).