A/HRC/44/50/Add.3 2. The events of August 2018 and January 2019 38. The Special Rapporteur’s dismay to hear allegations of politically motivated sexual violence through the testimonies of some women who reported to have been raped by presumed military and police elements is shared. However, the following aspects should be noted pertaining to the Special Rapporteur’s concerns: . In expressing its concern over the alleged sexual assault by the uniformed forces, the Government, through the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), reached out through the media and a press conference on 29 January 2019 to all the victims, calling on them to visit the nearest police stations and get assistance from the Victim Friendly Unit sections. However, there was no response from such victims. Furthermore, the Zimbabwe Gender Commission invited any victims to approach the Commission or other Commissions and Civil Society Organisations, but none came forward to report. Only one case of sexual abuse was received by the Police from an area called St. Mary’s in Chitungwiza, near Harare, during the period of the protests, which was however not directly related to the protests but to a domestic violence issue. The Zimbabwe Republic Police, in executing its mandate, does not sweep cases under the carpet. In fact, when members of the public fail to report, the Police always appeals for information in order to undertake investigations. 39. The Government of Zimbabwe does not subscribe to the assertion by the Special Rapporteur that there was no legal framework for involvement of the military in the violent and illegal demonstrations which took place on 1 August 2018. The Special Rapporteur’s allegations are preposterous as Section 213 (2) (b) of the Constitution provides for the deployment of the Defence Forces in support of the Police in the maintenance of public order. 40. The deployment of the military to assist the Police in maintaining law and order was governed by Section 37 of the Public Order and Security Act (Chapter 11:17) which stated that:“(1) If, upon a request made by the Commissioner General of Police, the Minister is satisfied that any regulating authority requires the assistance of the Defence Forces for the purpose of suppressing any civil commotion or disturbance in any police district, he may request the Minister responsible for Defence to authorise the Defence Forces to assist the police in the exercise of their functions under this Act in the police district concerned.” 41. The above provision entails that the Defence Forces can only come in to assist the Police upon request. Put differently, the military cannot on its own accord deploy itself to quell public disorder situations. The law clearly stipulated that whenever the Defence Forces are called in to assist the Police, they shall be under the command of the Police (regulating authority concerned), which is what transpired on 1 August 2018. 42. The legal parameters within which the request for and subsequent deployment of the army to assist the police was made was in terms of the Constitution and the then Public Order and Security Act. Thus, it is not true that there was no legal framework for such deployment. 43. It should also be noted that on both occasions, demonstrations were characterized by wanton acts of violence; arson worth millions of dollars; traffic barricades; harassment of motorists and indiscriminate looting of supermarkets and tuck-shops. This left the government in a dilemma of balancing two equally important interests: the rights of those who genuinely took part in the demonstrations to exercise their right to peaceful assembly, which were hijacked by looters, and the rights of those citizens who looked up to the State to protect them from the violent demonstrators. The State had a constitutionally enshrined duty to protect such citizens and to stop the loss of life. As a result, government deployed the police in both cases to stop the violent demonstrations. 44. The Special Rapporteur highlights in paragraph 62 that he became “… conscious of political polarisation, poor governance and a fragile economic situation which prompted a spiral of instability which in turn escalated, exacerbated and multiplied discontentment that lead to demonstrations and strikes ...” . Further, he advises that “… Government should look 10