A/HRC/45/CRP.7 that during the period 2015-2019 Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest importer of weapons.70 More specific data concerning transfers by individual States gives an indication of the scale of the arms transfers concerned. For example, the United States of America, over the past five years, has approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia worth some US$48.7 billion and to the UAE worth some US$11.6 billion.71 Leaked classified French Defence ministry documents indicate the use of French-made weapons in Yemen72 such as CAESAR howitzer, Leclerc battle tanks, the targeting system used aboard Saudi fighter-bombers, and Mirage 2000-9 used by the UAE.73 The United Kingdom is also one of the main exporters of weapons to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Since March 2015, more than £11 billion worth of UK arms have been licensed to Saudi Arabia.74 Canada has reportedly increased its military sales to Saudi Arabia,75 while the United Nations Security Council-mandated Panel of Experts has found that the Houthis are receiving military support, including drones and weapons, some with technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in Iran, in potential violation of a United Nations arms embargo.76 In a report seen by Reuters, the United Nations Secretary-General told the Security Council that cruise missiles used in several attacks on oil facilities and an international airport in Saudi Arabia last year were of “Iranian origin”.77 While further investigations are required to link particular imported weapons to specific violations, the Group believes that such transfers help perpetuate the conflict. Furthermore, the Group’s findings below detail a series of violations by all parties that must be considered by States when authorising exports of weapons that could be used in Yemen. V. A. Findings on violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law Attacks affecting civilians or civilian objects Applicable law 62. The principle of distinction, described by the ICJ as one of the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law,78 requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants/those taking a direct part in hostilities and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects.79 Parties to an armed conflict must not make civilians or 70 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 9 March 2020. See https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/usa-and-france-dramatically-increase-major-armsexports-saudi-arabia-largest-arms-importer-says. Also, see: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf 71 US Defence Security Cooperation Agency, Major Arms Sales. Available at: https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales 72 https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2019/04/france-leaked-military-documents-underscoreneed-to-end-flow-of-arms-to-yemen-conflict/ 73 https://made-in-france.disclose.ngo/en/chapter/yemen-papers/ 74 Bonyan Jamail & Dearbhla Minogue, Open Democracy, The UK must immediately stop selling arms that are killing Yemeni civilians, 20 May 2020. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/uk-must-immediately-stop-selling-armsare-killing-yemeni-civilians/ 75 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/canada-doubles-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabiadespite-moratorium; https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2020/04/10/canada-cuts-new-deal-with-saudi-arabiaclearing-way-for-more-arms-sales/ 76 S/2020/326, p. 2 77 https://fr.reuters.com/article/iran-usa-un-idINL1N2DP024 Also, see: https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2330556/un-missiles-used-attack-aramco-were-iranian-origin 78 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 257, para. 78. 79 The principle of distinction is implicit in Art 13(2) Additional Protocol II, and has been recognised as part of customary international humanitarian law applicable in NIAC: see ICRC Study on 20