A/HRC/45/CRP.7 the justice system was dominated by the executive branch, rather than operating as an independent institution.567 In the transition period of 2011-2014, the justice sector was one of the key areas identified as requiring structural reform. The National Dialogue Conference (NDC), for instance, highlighted the need for greater judicial independence, recommending, inter alia, reform of the Supreme Judicial Council 568 and the taking of measures to combat bias towards political parties, and sectarian or factional groups.569 384. A number of assessments of the justice system conducted during this transition period identified key weaknesses. Significant deficiencies were reported with respect to fair trial standards, including in death penalty cases.570 The use of torture to obtain confessions continued to occur, despite the unlawfulness of such conduct.571 Active discrimination against women (as judicial actors and as other participants in the system) was reported.572 Judges repeatedly engaged in strikes to protest at the threats and physical assaults they encountered.573 Judicial education and training, case management, backlogs and basic infrastructure were all identified as areas requiring development assistance. Corruption continued to be a systemic issue, with the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 2012 describing the judiciary as suffering from “endemic corruption”.574 External influences (such as political or tribal influences) at times influenced and subverted the proper application of laws.575 Allegations of nepotism and cronyism tainted the process for the appointment of some judicial, prosecutorial and other staff. Existing systems for rotation of judges and the formal system of accountability to address misconduct by judicial actors was vulnerable to manipulation, with the instigation of investigations, or the transfer of personnel, being used on occasion as a form of reprisal against individuals.576 Resource and infrastructure constraints also hampered performance. 385. Significant reforms were undertaken during the 2011-2014 period, particularly with respect to the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council and the restructuring of the Ministry of Justice.577 Capacity building of the judiciary intensified, and programmes to 567 As to pre-existing issues with respect to the independence of the judiciary, see for instance, Mohammed Alshuwaiter and Emelie Kozak, The Judiciary in Yemen: The Status Quo, Current Challenges and Post-Conflict Considerations, Deep Root Report (2019) pp. 2-4. See too Laila alZwaini, The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges, HiiL Rule of Law Quick Scan Series, (2012), p. 64. 568 Under the Constitution, the Superior Judicial Council has the function of executing “guarantees for the judiciary in the fields of appointment, promotion, discharge and dismissal according to the law.” (Constitution, art. 152) In reality, it exercises significant power: determining, for instance, the number of courts, the territorial jurisdiction of courts, the appointment, assignment, transfer and removal of judges and prosecutors, and handling disciplinary action. Reforming the membership to reduce the level of executive control has been a key focus for reform. 569 National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document, p. 59. 570 A 2014 study undertaken by the United States Institute for Peace concluded that the information collected “suggested serious, frequent and widespread deviations from criminal procedure and violations of Yemeni law”: Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari, Justice in Transition in Yemen: A Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten Governorates (2014), p. 45. 571 Laila Al-Zwaini, The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges, HiiL Rule of Law Quick Scan Series, (2012), p. 82. As to earlier consideration by the Committee against Torture, see Concluding Observations: Yemen, CAT/C/YEM/CO/2/Rev.1 (2010), paras. 8, 28. 572 As to systemic legal discrimination, see for instance, UNDP, Yemen: Gender Justice and The Law (2018), p. 12. 573 See eg, coverage of this in previous High Commissioner for Human Rights reports: A/HRC/24/34, para.35; A/HRC/27/44, para. 42. 574 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Yemen, CCPR/C/YEM/CO/5, para. 17. 575 Laila Al-Zwaini, The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges, HiiL Rule of Law Quick Scan Series, (2012), p. 64. 576 Ibid., pp. 26, 64. 577 Government of Yemen’s UPR Report (2018), paras. 8-9. 96