A/HRC/43/66 party, the broad principle relevant to the study was reiterated, that negotiations regarding the return of illicit assets between countries of origin and countries of destination should include a human rights component from the outset. 10. The situation concerning the repatriation of illicit funds being highly unsatisfactory, in the study, the Advisory Committee considered the possibility of utilizing non-repatriated illicit funds, including by monetizing them and establishing investment funds, while the appropriate legal procedures were completed. Little work has been done to explore such possibilities. Several obstacles – of a legal, political or other nature – prevent the swift repatriation of illicit funds. The obstacles affect human rights and are highly detrimental to the countries of origin. The excessive delays and lengthy court procedures, such as in the cases involving the repatriation of illicit funds to Mali, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines and Zambia, hinder development in many countries that are victims of transfers of illicit funds and may prevent such countries from attaining the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. 11. In its resolutions 31/22 and 34/11, the Human Rights Council did not indicate whether the Advisory Committee should focus its study on the source of funds of illicit origin, in order to determine whether the funds emanated from the State, including public authorities and institutions, or whether they emanated from any other private entity or person. Taking a more general approach would mean looking at all illicit funds that are the result of illicit financial flows generated not only by economic or political authorities and institutions, but also by private citizens or companies, including for the purposes of tax evasion, embezzlement, money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. II. Nature of illicit funds 12. In the study conducted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 31/22, the Advisory Committee provided an analysis of the definition of “illicit financial flows”, which is complex and not unanimously agreed upon. The Committee underlined that there were two interpretations of the word “illicit”: the first referred to funds illegally earned and the second referred to funds acquired from legitimate economic activities that became illicit due to a subsequent contravention or circumvention of the laws governing how those funds should be handled or addressed. Whereas it is true that the majority of illicit financial flows are related to cross-border tax transactions, corruption-based outflows constitute a small fraction of the total (A/HRC/36/52 and Corr.1, para. 9). 13. Illicit financial flows have a negative impact on human rights, irrespective of who is at the origin of the illicit transactions. However, with regard to the utilization of illicit funds pending repatriation, it would be more appropriate to look primarily at the illicit funds operated by the State, including other public authorities and institutions, so as to focus on the particular phenomenon of assets stolen and transferred by former dictators and their associates from developing countries to financial institutions in developed countries. 14. The reason for adopting such an approach is that judicial notice may be taken, in relevant cases, that certain heads of State (known to be dictators) and their associates have amassed immense fortunes abroad – the legitimate source of which cannot be explained. There arises a presumption that the funds are of illicit origin, even though that presumption is still subject to challenge in the courts of countries of destination and probably also in the courts of countries of origin. As explained below, it would be easier to have the funds frozen, either by judicial order or administratively. In its resolutions 31/22, 34/11 and 40/4, the Human Rights Council placed greater emphasis on corruption than on what may be termed management of private wealth. 15. The flow of funds coming from the management of private wealth, for example by shopping for tax advantages, may not always be seen as illicit funds under the law. It would be difficult to always rely on the presumption that the sources of funds in such cases are illicit. Funds transferred to offshore accounts and well-known financial centres have not always been gained illicitly. Furthermore, the courts in countries of destination tend to be strict in the application of the legal rules relating to the presumption of innocence, the presumption of lawfulness of transactions and the protection of property rights, which 4