A/HRC/14/46 by criminalizing any failure to cooperate with them.30 This implies that oversight institutions have recourse to law enforcement authorities in order to secure the cooperation of relevant individuals.31 While strong legal powers are essential for effective oversight, it is good practice for these to be accompanied by the human and financial resources needed to make use of these powers, and, thus, to fulfil their mandates. Accordingly, many oversight institutions have their own independent budget provided directly by parliament,32 the capacity to employ specialized staff,33 and to engage the services of external experts.34 Practice 8. Oversight institutions take all necessary measures to protect classified information and personal data to which they have access during the course of their work. Penalties are provided for the breach of these requirements by members of oversight institutions. 15. Intelligence oversight institutions have access to classified and sensitive information during the course of their work. Therefore, a variety of mechanisms are put in place to ensure that oversight institutions and their members do not disclose such information either inadvertently or deliberately. Firstly, in almost all cases, members and staffers of oversight institutions are prohibited from making unauthorized disclosure of information; failure to comply with these proscriptions is generally sanctioned through civil and/or criminal penalties.35 Secondly, many oversight institutions also subject members and staff to security clearance procedures before giving them access to classified information.36 An alternative to this approach, most commonly seen in parliamentary oversight institutions, is for members to be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.37 Ultimately, the appropriate handling of classified information by oversight institutions also relies upon the professional behaviour of the members of the oversight institutions. C. Complaints and effective remedy Practice 9. Any individual who believes that her or his rights have been infringed by an intelligence service is able to bring a complaint to a court or oversight institution, such as an ombudsman, human rights commissioner or national human rights institution. Individuals affected by the illegal actions of an intelligence service have recourse to an institution that can provide an effective remedy, including full reparation for the harm suffered. 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 10 South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 7a. Belgium (footnote 22), art. 48; The Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 74.6. Belgium (footnote 22), art. 66 bis. Canada (footnote 6), sect. 36. Concerning the assistance of external experts, see Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 76; Lithuania (footnote 23), art. 23 (2); Luxembourg, Law concerning the organization of the State intelligence service, art. 14 (4). On having the disposition of independent legal staff and advice: United Kingdom, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 25 March 2010, paras. 110–111. Lithuania (footnote 23), art. 23.4. In South Africa, the law prescribes criminal sanctions for any unauthorized disclosure by members of the parliamentary oversight body; see South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 7a (a); United States of America Code, General congressional oversight provisions, sect. 413 (d); Norway (footnote 22), art. 9. For example, the staff of the German Parliamentary Control Panel undergo strict security checks; see Germany, Parliamentary Control Panel Act, sects. 11 (1) and 12 (1). As elected representatives of the people, the members of the Parliamentary Control Panel are not obliged to undergo a vetting and clearing procedure, see Germany (footnote 36), sect. 2; United States of America (footnote 35), sect. 413 (d). GE.10-13410