A/HRC/14/46 16. It is widely acknowledged that any measure restricting human rights must be accompanied by adequate safeguards, including independent institutions, through which individuals can seek redress in the event that their rights are violated.38 Intelligence services possess a range of powers – including powers of surveillance, arrest and detention, which, if misused, may violate human rights. Accordingly, institutions exist to handle complaints raised by individuals who believe their rights have been violated by intelligence services and, where necessary, to provide victims of human rights violations with an effective remedy. Two broad approaches can be distinguished in this regard.39 First, States have established a range of non-judicial institutions to handle complaints pertaining to intelligence services. These include the ombudsman,40 the national human rights commission,41 the national audit office,42 the parliamentary oversight body,43 the inspector general,44 the specialized intelligence oversight body45 and the complaints commission for intelligence services.46 These institutions are empowered to receive and investigate complaints; however, since they cannot generally issue binding orders or provide remedies, victims of human rights violations have to seek remedies through the courts. Second, judicial institutions may receive complaints pertaining to intelligence services. These institutions may be judicial bodies set up exclusively for this purpose,47 or part of the general judicial system; they are usually empowered to order remedial action. Practice 10. The institutions responsible for addressing complaints and claims for effective remedy arising from the activities of intelligence services are independent of the intelligence services and the political executive. Such institutions have full and unhindered access to all relevant information, the necessary resources and expertise to conduct investigations, and the capacity to issue binding orders. 17. In order for an institution to provide effective remedies for human rights violations, it must be independent of the institutions involved in the impugned activities, able to ensure procedural fairness, have sufficient investigative capacity and expertise, and the capacity to issue binding decisions.48 For this reason, States have endowed such institutions with the requisite legal powers to investigate complaints and provide remedies to victims of human rights violations perpetrated by intelligence services. These powers include full and 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 GE.10-13410 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 25; Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 23; Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, annex ( E/CN.4/1984/4), art. 8; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2. Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies, Oslo, Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005, p. 105. Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 83; in Finland: with regard to data stored by the intelligence service, the Data Protection Ombudsman (reply); Greece: Ombudsman (reply); Estonia: Legal Chancellor (reply). Jordan, Law on the National Centre for Human Rights. For control of the budget of the intelligence service: Costa Rica, Organic Act of the Republic’s General Audit. Romania (footnote 15), art. 16. South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 7(7). Norway (footnote 22), art. 3; Canada (footnote 6), sects. 41, 42, 46 and 50. Kenya (footnote 16), arts. 24–26. United Kingdom, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, arts. 65–70; Sierra Leone (footnote 14), arts. 24–25. Iain Cameron, National security and the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends and patterns, presented at the Stockholm international symposium on national security and the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 50. 11