A/HRC/14/46 party.57 In addition, various States have taken measures to safeguard the neutrality of the directors of intelligence services. For example, the appointment of the director of intelligence services is open to scrutiny from outside the executive;58 there are legal provisions on the duration of tenure and specification of the grounds for the dismissal of directors, as well as safeguards against improper pressure being applied on directors of intelligence services.59 Practice 13. Intelligence services are prohibited from using their powers to target lawful political activity or other lawful manifestations of the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression. 20. Intelligence services have recourse to information-collection measures that may interfere with legitimate political activities and other manifestations of the freedoms of expression, association and assembly.60 These rights are fundamental to the functioning of a free society, including political parties, the media and civil society. Therefore, States have taken measures to reduce the scope for their intelligence services to target (or to be asked to target) these individuals and groups engaged in these activities. Such measures include absolute prohibitions on targeting lawful activities, and strict limitations on both the use of intelligence collection measures (see practice 21) and the retention and use of personal data collected by intelligence services (see practice 23).61 In view of the fact that the media plays a crucial role in any society, some States have instituted specific measures to protect journalists from being targeted by intelligence services.62 E. State responsibility for intelligence services Practice 14. States are internationally responsible for the activities of their intelligence services and agents, and any private contractors they engage, regardless of where these activities take place and who the victim of internationally wrongful conduct is. Therefore, the executive power takes measures to ensure and exercise overall control of and responsibility for their intelligence services. 21. States are responsible under international law for the activities of their intelligence services and agents wherever they operate in the world. This responsibility extends to any private contractors that States engage to undertake intelligence functions.63 States have a legal obligation to ensure that their intelligence services do not violate human rights and to 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 GE.10-13410 15 (1)a; Lithuania (footnote 9), art. 24. Botswana (footnote 21), sect. 5(2); Sierra Leone (footnote 14), sect. 13 (d); United Kingdom (footnote 20), sect. 2 (2); South Africa (footnote 17), sect. 199(7). For the involvement of parliament, see Belgium (footnote 22), art. 17; and Australia (footnote 3), sect. 17(3). Poland, Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Act, art. 16; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 15(2). Canada, MacDonald Commission, p. 514; South African Ministerial Review Commission, pp. 168– 169, 174–175; Venice Commission (1998), p. 25. Canada (footnote 6), sect. 2; Switzerland (footnote 5), art. 3 (1); Japan, Act Regarding the Control of Organizations having Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder, art. 3(1) and (2); United Republic of Tanzania, Intelligence and Security Act, art. 5 (2)b. Netherlands, Security and Intelligence Review Commission, Supervisory Report no. 10 on the investigation by the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) into the leaking of State secrets, 2006, point 11.5. Montreux document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, pp. 12, 35. 13