A/HRC/14/46 international law. Some States have included explicit prohibitions on serious human rights violations in their laws on intelligence services.101 While non-derogable human rights may be singled out as inviolable, every human right includes an essential core that is beyond the reach of permissible limitations. 32. States ensure that intelligence measures that restrict human rights are subject to a legally prescribed process of authorization, as well as ex post oversight and review (see practices 6, 7, 21, 22, 28 and 32). 33. It is a fundamental requirement of international human rights law that victims of human rights violations be able to seek redress and remedy. Many States have procedures in place to ensure that individuals have access to an independent institution that can adjudicate on such claims (see practices 9 and 10 above).102 I. Intelligence collection Practice 21. National law outlines the types of collection measures available to intelligence services; the permissible objectives of intelligence collection; the categories of persons and activities which may be subject to intelligence collection; the threshold of suspicion required to justify the use of collection measures; the limitations on the duration for which collection measures may be used; and the procedures for authorizing, overseeing and reviewing the use of intelligencecollection measures. 34. In most States, intelligence services have recourse to intrusive measures, such as covert surveillance and the interception of communications, in order to collect information necessary to fulfil their mandates. It is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law that individuals must be aware of measures that public authorities may use to restrict their rights and be able to foresee which activities may give rise to their use.103 National law outlines the categories of persons and activities that may be subject to intelligence collection,104 as well as the threshold of suspicion required for particular collection measures to be initiated.105 Some national laws also impose specific limitations on the use of intrusive collection measures against particular categories of individuals, notably journalists and lawyers.106 These measures are designed to protect professional privileges deemed to be essential to the functioning of a free society, such as the right of journalists not to disclose their sources, or lawyer-client privilege. Strict limitations on the use of intrusive collection 101 102 103 104 105 106 GE.10-13410 Botswana (footnote 21), sect. 16 (1)(b)(i) related to the prohibition of torture and similar treatment. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 25; Arab Charter, art. 9; Siracusa principles, art. 8; European Court of Human Rights, Klass v. Germany, A 28 (1979-80), 2 EHHR 214, para. 69. See also practices 9 and10. European Court of Human Rights, Liberty v. UK, para 63; Malone v. The United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, para.67; Council of Europe (footnote 4), art. V (i); Huvig v. France, para. 32; Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22 (4); Romania (footnote 8), art. 20. This recommendation is also made in the Moroccan TRC Report, vol. 1, chap. IV, 8-4; Hungary (footnote 77), sects. 54, 56; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 33 (3-6). European Court of Human Rights, Weber & Saravia v. Germany, decision on admissibility, para. 95; European Court of Human Rights, Huvig v France, 24 April 1990, para. 34; United Republic of Tanzania (footnote 61), art. 15(1). Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22 (1); Sierra Leone (footnote 14), art. 22; Tanzania (footnote 61), art. 14 (1), 15 (1); Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21 (all reasonable grounds); Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 6(a) (serious suspicion); Germany (footnote 2), sect. 9(2); Germany, Constitutional Court, Judgement on Provisions in North-Rhine Westphalia Constitution Protection Act, 27 February 2008. Germany, G10 Act, sect. 3b; Germany (footnote 85), sects. 53 and 53a. 19