A/HRC/14/46 practice for this multilevel system of oversight to include at least one institution that is fully independent of both the intelligence services and the political executive. This approach ensures that there is a separation of powers in the oversight of intelligence services; the institutions that commission, undertake and receive the outputs of intelligence activities are not the only institutions that oversee these activities. All dimensions of the work of intelligence services are subject to the oversight of one or a combination of external institutions. One of the primary functions of a system of oversight is to scrutinize intelligence services’ compliance with applicable law, including human rights. Oversight institutions are mandated to hold intelligence services and their employees to account for any violations of the law.23 In addition, oversight institutions assess the performance of intelligence services.24 This includes examining whether intelligence services make efficient and effective use of the public funds allocated to them.25 An effective system of oversight is particularly important in the field of intelligence because these services conduct much of their work in secret and hence cannot be easily overseen by the public. Intelligence oversight institutions serve to foster public trust and confidence in the work of intelligence services by ensuring that they perform their statutory functions in accordance with respect for the rule of law and human rights.26 Practice 7. Oversight institutions have the power, resources and expertise to initiate and conduct their own investigations, as well as full and unhindered access to the information, officials and installations necessary to fulfil their mandates. Oversight institutions receive the full cooperation of intelligence services and law enforcement authorities in hearing witnesses, as well as obtaining documentation and other evidence. 14. Oversight institutions enjoy specific powers to enable them to perform their functions. In particular, they have the power to initiate their own investigations into areas of the intelligence service’s work that fall under their mandates, and are granted access to all information necessary to do so. These powers of access to information encompass the legal authority to view all relevant files and documents,27 inspect the premises of intelligence services,28 and to summon any member of the intelligence services to give evidence under oath.29 These powers help to ensure that overseers can effectively scrutinize the activities of intelligence services and fully investigate possible contraventions of the law. A number of States have taken steps to reinforce the investigative competences of oversight institutions 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 GE.10-13410 20), chapter 6; Belgium, Law on the Control of Police and Intelligence Services and the Centre for Threat Analysis, chapter 3. For mandates to oversee intelligence services’ compliance with the law, see Lithuania, Law on Operational Activities, art. 23(2)1–2; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 112; Norway (footnote 22), sect. 2. In South Africa, the Inspector-General for intelligence examines intelligence services’ compliance with the law and Constitution; see South Africa, Intelligence Services Oversight Act, sect. 7(7) a-b. South African Ministerial Review Commission report, p. 56; Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable, Oslo, Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005, pp. 16–20. Romania (footnote 2), art. 42. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, a new review mechanism for the RMCP’s national security activities (hereafter the Arar Commission), p. 469. Sweden, Act on Supervision of Certain Crime-Fighting Activities, art. 4; Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 73; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 38(c). South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 8(a) goes beyond the intelligence community to allowing the Inspector-General access any premises, if necessary. According to sect. 8 (8)c, the Inspector-General can obtain warrants under the Criminal Procedure Act. Croatia (footnote 2), art. 105; Lithuania (footnote 23), art. 23. 9