A/HRC/14/46 methods help to ensure that intelligence collection is both necessary and limited to individuals and groups that are likely to be involved in activities posing a threat to national security. National law also includes guidelines on the permissible duration of the use of intrusive collection measures, after which time intelligence services are required to seek reauthorization in order to continue using them.107 Similarly, it is good practice for national law to require that intelligence collection measures are ceased as soon as the purpose for which they were used has been fulfilled or if it becomes clear that that purpose cannot be met.108 These provisions serve to minimize infringements on the rights of individuals concerned and help to ensure that intelligence-collection measures meet the requirement of proportionality. Practice 22. Intelligence-collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are authorized and overseen by at least one institution that is external to and independent of the intelligence services. This institution has the power to order the revision, suspension or termination of such collection measures. Intelligence-collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are subject to a multilevel process of authorization that includes approval within intelligence services, by the political executive and by an institution that is independent of the intelligence services and the executive. 35. It is common practice for national laws to include detailed provisions on the process for authorizing all intelligence collection measures that restrict human rights.109 Authorization processes require intelligence services to justify the proposed use of intelligence-collection measures in accordance with a clearly defined legal framework (see practices 20 and 21 above). This is a key mechanism for ensuring that collection measures are used in accordance with the law. It is good practice for intrusive collection measures to be authorized by an institution that is independent of the intelligence services, i.e., a politically accountable member of the executive110 or a (quasi) judicial body.111 Judicial bodies are independent of the intelligence process and therefore best placed to conduct an independent and impartial assessment of an application to use intrusive collection powers.112 Furthermore, it is notably good practice for the authorization of the most intrusive intelligence collection methods (e.g. the interception of the content of communications, the interception of mail and surreptitious entry into property) to include 107 108 109 110 111 112 20 Germany (footnote 106), sect. 10 (5); Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22 (6); Romania (footnote 8), art. 21(10); South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 11(3)a; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 37; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21 (5); Hungary (footnote 77), sect. 58(4), sect. 60 (termination); European Court of Human Rights, Weber & Saravia v. Germany, para. 95. United Kingdom (footnote 47), sect. 9; Germany (footnote 106), sect. 11(2); Germany (footnote 2), sect. 9 (1); European Court of Human Rights, Huvig v France, para. 34. Germany (footnote 106), sects. 9–10; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21; Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 20(4) and 25(4); Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22. Australia (footnote 3), arts. 25, 25a; Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 19, 20(3–4), 22 (4), 25; United Kingdom (footnote 47), sects. 5–7. Argentina (footnote 2), arts. 18 and 19; Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22; Sierra Leone (footnote 14), art. 22; Croatia (footnote 2), arts. 36–38; Romania (footnote 8), arts. 21 and 22; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21 (1–2); South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 11. See also European Court of Human Rights, Klass v. Germany (footnote 102), para. 56. The European Court of Human Rights has indicated its preference for judicial control for the use of intrusive collection methods, see Klass v. Germany (footnote 102), paras. 55–56. See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, recommendation 1402, ii. The South African Ministerial Review Commission argues that all intrusive methods should require judicial authorizations; see p. 175; Cameron (footnote 48), pp. 151, 156–158. GE.10-13410