A/HRC/14/46 apprehension/detention;152 and that individuals detained by intelligence services have access to legal representation.153 Practice 30. Intelligence services are not permitted to operate their own detention facilities or to make use of any unacknowledged detention facilities operated by third parties. 44. It is good practice for intelligence services to be explicitly prohibited in national law from operating their own detention facilities.154 If intelligence services are permitted to exercise powers of arrest and detention, the individuals concerned are remanded in regular detention centres administered by law enforcement agencies.155 Equally, intelligence services are not permitted to make use of unacknowledged detention facilities run by third parties, such as private contractors. These are essential safeguards against arbitrary detention by intelligence services and/or the possible development of a parallel detention regime in which individuals could be held in conditions that do not meet international standards of detention and due process. L. Intelligence-sharing and cooperation Practice 31. Intelligence-sharing between intelligence agencies of the same State or with the authorities of a foreign State is based on national law that outlines clear parameters for intelligence exchange, including the conditions that must be met for information to be shared, the entities with which intelligence may be shared, and the safeguards that apply to exchanges of intelligence. 45. It is good practice for all forms of information-sharing between intelligence services and other domestic or foreign entities to have a clear basis in national law. National law includes criteria on the purposes for which intelligence may be shared, the entities with which it may be shared, and the procedural safeguards that apply to intelligence-sharing.156 A legal basis for intelligence-sharing is an important requirement of the rule of law, and is particularly important when personal data are exchanged, because this directly infringes the right to privacy and may affect a range of other rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition to ensuring that intelligence-sharing is based on national law, it is widely accepted as good practice that intelligence-sharing be based on written agreements or memoranda between the parties, which comply with guidelines laid down in national law.157 The elements that are commonly included in such agreements include rules governing the use of shared information, a statement of the parties’ compliance with human rights and data protection, and the provision that the sending service may request feedback on the use of 152 153 154 155 156 157 26 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7(4); European Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2); European Code of Police Ethics, art. 45; Council of Europe (footnote 4), art. VII (1); OSCE-ODIHR, Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights, p. 157; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, para. 40; Norway (footnote 140), sect. 177. See also European Code of Police Ethics, arts. 48, 50, 54, 55 and 57; Bulgaria (footnote 15), art. 125(6); and Norway (footnote 140), sect. 186. Romania (footnote 2), art. 13. Australia (footnote 3), sect. 34G(3)(i)(iii); Lithuania (footnote 9), art. 19(4); Venice Commission (1998), sect. E. Croatia (footnote 2), arts. 58, 60; Switzerland (footnote 5), art. 17; Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 37, 41 and 42, 58–63; Albania (footnote 21), art. 19; Canada (footnote 6), arts. 17, 19; Germany (footnote 2), sects. 19, 20, Germany (footnote 99), sect. 9; Germany (footnote 106), sects. 4 (4–6), 7 , 7a, 8 (6); Hungary (footnote 77), sects. 40, 44, 45. See also Canada, MacDonald Commission Report, p. 1080. Canada, Arar Commission, pp. 321–322; Venice Commission (2007), p. 182. GE.10-13410