A/HRC/14/46 the shared information.158 Intelligence-sharing agreements help to establish mutually agreed standards and expectations about shared information, and reduce the scope for informal intelligence-sharing, which cannot be easily reviewed by oversight institutions. Practice 32. National law outlines the process for authorizing both the agreements upon which intelligence-sharing is based and the ad hoc sharing of intelligence. Executive approval is needed for any intelligence-sharing agreements with foreign entities, as well as for the sharing of intelligence that may have significant implications for human rights. 46. It is good practice for national law to set out guidelines for the authorization of the sending of information on an ad hoc basis, as well as for the establishment of agreements for intelligence-sharing.159 This serves to ensure that there are established channels of responsibility for intelligence-sharing and that relevant individuals can be held to account for any decisions they make in this regard. In many States, routine intelligence-sharing at the domestic level is authorized internally (within the intelligence services). However, when information shared by intelligence services may be used in court proceedings, it is good practice for executive authorization to be required; the use of intelligence in such proceedings may have profound implications for the rights of the individuals concerned, as well as for the activities of the intelligence services themselves.160 Additionally, many national laws require executive authorization for the sharing of intelligence or establishment of sharing agreements with foreign entities.161 Practice 33. Before entering into an intelligence-sharing agreement or sharing intelligence on an ad hoc basis, intelligence services undertake an assessment of the counterpart’s record on human rights and data protection, as well as the legal safeguards and institutional controls that govern the counterpart. Before handing over information, intelligence services make sure that any shared intelligence is relevant to the recipient’s mandate, will be used in accordance with the conditions attached and will not be used for purposes that violate human rights. 47. Both the sending and receipt of intelligence can have important implications for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Information sent to a foreign Government or intelligence service may not only contribute to legal limitations on the rights of an individual, but could also serve as the basis for human rights violations. Similarly, intelligence received from a foreign entity may have been obtained in violation of international human rights law. Therefore, before entering into a sharing agreement or sharing any information, it is good practice for intelligence services to conduct a general assessment of a foreign counterpart’s record on human rights and the protection of personal data, as well as the legal and institutional safeguards (such as oversight) that apply to those services.162 Before sharing information on specific individuals or groups, intelligence services take steps to assess the possible impact on the individuals concerned.163 It is good 158 159 160 161 162 163 GE.10-13410 Canada, Arar Commission, p. 339; Germany (footnote 2), sect. 19; Germany (footnote 106), sect. 7a(4); Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 37, 59; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 60 (3). Croatia (footnote 2), art. 59(2); United Republic of Tanzania (footnote 61), art. 15 (3) (4); Canada (footnote 6), art. 17. Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 38.1 and 61; Canada (footnote 6), art. 17.1 (a). Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 59 (5–6); Croatia (footnote 2), art. 59(2); United Kingdom, Intelligence and Security Committee, p. 54; Canada (footnote 6), art. 17.1 (b); Germany (footnote 106), art. 7a; Germany (footnote 2), sect. 19(1). Netherlands, Review Committee for the Security and Intelligence Services, review report on the cooperation of the GISS with Foreign intelligence and/or security services, pp. 7–11, 43; Arar Commission pp. 345, 348. Croatia (footnote 2), art. 60 (1); Germany (footnote 2), sect. 19; Switzerland (footnote 5), art. 17 (4); 27