A/HRC/45/32 within the judiciary and subjugates it to the executive branch.22 The situation is so bad that the authorities have forced the already poor population to financially support the organization of the 2020 elections and various projects.23 1. Corruption 67. Corruption takes many forms and specifically includes trading in influence and abuse of office or power. To obtain a mining licence, a large sum of money must be paid to certain persons holding high political or administrative positions or to senior CNDD-FDD officials, either directly or through intermediaries. Some of those who benefit from this also hold shares in mining companies, sometimes through front operations. The Commission has also received allegations that there are similar practices in most sectors of the Burundian economy, especially when foreign companies want to invest in Burundi. 2. Misappropriation of public funds 68. From a global perspective, the Commission drew on a study of official development assistance disbursements from the World Bank to the poorest countries, carried out by economists who showed that between 1990 and 2010 there was a strong link between such payments and residents’ transfers to tax havens.24 The Commission relied on public data from the World Bank listing the amounts paid out per quarter and per project and the amounts of assets held by Burundian residents abroad, published by the Bank for International Settlements from 2010 to 2019.25 In this period, there is clearly a correlation for assets held in Belgium, Switzerland and Luxembourg. The holdings in question are those of natural or legal persons with residence in Burundi, but such persons are not necessarily nationals. There may be legal grounds for such transfers, but the extent of the coincidence calls for further investigation. 69. The Commission has received credible allegations of misappropriation of public funds intended for various development projects financed by international assistance. For example, some Burundian families whose property was expropriated for the construction of public projects did not receive the planned compensation, which reportedly had been partially misappropriated. The Government of Burundi has publicly acknowledged that such misappropriation has taken place in connection with the construction of the presidential palace in Gasenyi.26 70. The construction of the Jiji and Mulembwe dams was to be accompanied by the payment by the Government of Burundi of US$ 14.3 million for the electrification of local villages and compensation for those whose property was expropriated. 27 However, the finance bills provided much lower amounts for the compensation. The difference between these budgets and the amounts called for in the development assistance thus raises some questions. 71. Mining agreements between private companies and the State generally provide for the payment by the company of annual compensation to the communes and the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars for the economic and social development of the region. However, the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that under several mining concession agreements, a significant portion of these funds has not been received by the intended recipients or has not materialized in development projects on the ground. This raises 22 23 24 25 26 27 GE.20-10689 A/HRC/39/CRP.1, paras. 462–579; and A/HRC/36/CRP.1, paras. 318–320 (document available on the Commission’s website). A/HRC/39/CRP.1, paras. 634–646. J.J. Andersen, N. Johannesen and B. Rijkers, “Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts”, Policy Research Working Paper 9150 (World Bank, 2020). Bank for International Settlements, “Banks’ cross-border positions on residents of Burundi”. Available at http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/A6.2?c=BI&p (accessed 6 August 2020). See www.dw.com/fr/construction-dun-nouveau-palais-pr%C3%A9sidentiel-des-burundaisexpropri%C3%A9s-attendent-toujours/a-41072323. See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/241731548424957473/pdf/PHJIMU-Rapport-dAudit1-janv-au-30-Juin-2018.pdf. 13