A/HRC/12/31* page 18 that are sensitive to human rights standards that have contributed to highlighting weaknesses in implementation and to redressing some persisting problems. The Act guarantees a legal minimum daily wage; workers who are unable to obtain employment through the scheme are entitled to unemployment benefit. Records of funds received and projects carried out through the Act are publicly available at the district level and can also be obtained through the right of access under the Right to Information Act of 2005. Although significant problems remain in the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, this transparency requirement constitutes an important safeguard. In addition, the intervention of agricultural workers’ trade unions, which organized workers participating in schemes under the Act, improved both levels of participation in the scheme and compliance with minimum wage requirements. 31. The strengthening of social assistance programmes has a fiscal cost. For developing countries, spending on safety nets has averaged from 1 to 2 per cent of GDP in recent years, but there are wide variations between countries, depending on the generosity of the programmes and the administrative costs involved,24 and the quality of targeting. Because of these costs, questions about the fiscal sustainability of social assistance programmes can constitute an obstacle to their very adoption, and to their maintenance following a crisis, as a permanent safeguard against sudden loss of revenues for the poorest members of society. This is regrettable: one of the reasons why the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act has been generally more satisfactory than other programmes put in place as a response to the crisis is because it is a permanent programme, well known to its potential beneficiaries, and the implementation of which is easier in times of crisis because of the familiarity with the procedures of the local officials responsible. The establishment of standing social assistance programmes is also consistent with a rights-based approach; those in need of support should not have to wait until the Government declares an emergency and acts accordingly. 32. The international community can help overcome the uncertainty factor inherent in the strengthening of social protection in developing countries by ensuring them against the risk that social protection schemes, once put in place, do not become fiscally unsustainable following domestic or international shocks, such as a sudden loss of export revenue, sharp increases in the price of food commodities on international markets or poor harvests in the country concerned. A global reinsurance mechanism could be put in place, with premiums ideally paid in part by the country seeking insurance and matched by donor contributions, thus creating an incentive for countries to put in place robust social protection programmes for the benefit of their population.25 24 The administrative costs of cash transfers are relatively low: about 5 per cent of total programme costs after start-up, compared with 36 per cent of total programme costs for food-based programmes. See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, op. cit., p. 126. 25 On this proposal, see Sanjay G. Reddy, “Safety nets for the poor: a missing international dimension?” in Giovanni Andrea Cornia (ed.), Pro-Poor Macroeconomics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 144-165.