A/HRC/41/CRP.1 339. While the responsibility to protect has been invoked largely in response to threats originating from private persons and entities (for instance in the context of preventing domestic violence and feminicide), it may be invoked as well against threats by other States, international organizations and foreign corporations operating within the territory of a State or in other areas subject to their jurisdiction.279 340. This recognition is particularly important in view of the patterns identified earlier of the extra-territorial outreach of States seeking to violate human rights violations, including the right to life, but also the right to freedom of expression or privacy through surveillance and harassment. 341. The extra territorial use of force is defined here as the use of potentially lethal force by a State against an individual or a group of individuals located on the territory of another State. Extraterritorial use of force is not a new phenomenon. It has been repeatedly invoked in the name of “self-defense” and countering “terrorism” and is the object of many legal analyses which are beyond the focus of this annual report 280. Previous Special Rapporteurs have thoroughly analysed the extraterritorial use of force including targeted killings through drones.281 For the purpose of a report on the responsibility to protect and warn, the following aspects of extra territorial use of force will be highlighted. 342. First, it is important to highlight and insist that Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law prohibit the threat or use of inter-State force, subject to limited exceptions: consent and self-defense. A State may consent to the use of force on its territory by another State, while the UN Charter allows action taken in self-defence. 343. Outside these narrowly defined conditions, the use of force extra territorially is unlawful under international law governing intra-states relationship. It is also unlawful under international human rights law in that a State party cannot perpetrate violations of its obligations on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory282. That human rights treaty obligations apply to the conduct of a State outside its territory has been confirmed by, among others, the International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights283. 344. Further, customary law prohibits states from sending their agents to the territory of another state to execute their own laws or policies: “This ban on the extraterritorial enforcement of a state’s laws or policies comes from international law’s basic rules on jurisdiction. While states enjoy jurisdiction to prescribe laws governing some conduct beyond their borders—e.g., by their own nationals—and states can use their courts to adjudicate matters taking place abroad, enforcement of a state’s laws or policies on another state’s territory without the permission of the other state is unlawful. 284 ”The jurisprudence on rendition and extraordinary rendition further suggests that the obligation to protect against acts by foreign States may be invoked whether or not these foreign States acted with the acquiescence or agreement of the receiving State285. 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 GC36, para 22 For an in-depth review of the jurisprudence, State positions and academic literature see for instance: Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial use of force against Non-State actors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights and Personal Self-Defense in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2017. See for instance A/68/382; A/HRC/1424 Add.6 A/68/382 See for instance Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, para. 109; General comment No. 31 (2004), on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties, para. 10; Coard and others v. United States, case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, 29 September 1999, para. 37’ Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, application No. 55721/07, Grand Chamber judgement of 7 July 2011, paras 106-186; https://www.lawfareblog.com/khashoggi-murder-how-mohammed-bin-salman-underestimatedinternational-law Concluding Observations Poland (2010), para 15. The Human Rights Committee has also ruled that to surrender a prisoner knowingly to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being tortured, runs counter to the object and purpose of the prohibition 67