A/HRC/41/CRP.1 Arabia has not yet charged. No country has offered explanations as to how they selected the targeted individuals and why they excluded others.206 237. The inquiry undertaken by the Special Rapporteur is not that of a court of law. As such it has neither the mandate nor the resources to make final judgement as to the criminal liability of specific individuals. What it can do and has done is to assess the facts, as developed to date, to determine, on that basis, whether there are reasonable grounds suggesting criminal liability warranting further investigations. 238. This objective raises the question of the legal framework against which individual responsibilities for the execution of Mr. Khashoggi are to be analysed. The Special Rapporteur is referencing below the standards of individual liability that may be found in the International Convention on the Protection of All Persons Against Enforced Disappearance and the Convention Against Torture, as well as international criminal law. In setting these forth, the Special Rapporteur is not advocating for a specific form of responsibility or making a judgement between various theories of criminal responsibility. The standards she outlines are intended only to provide context for the facts described and are not intended to suggest that individuals should be charged with a particular crime. The decision as to the appropriate legal framework and what charges, if any, should be brought against which individual is left to whatever forum or tribunal might be constituted to further investigate this matter. Individual Liability Standards 239. Under the International Convention against Enforced Disappearances, “any person who commits, orders, solicits or induces the commission of, attempts to commit, is an accomplice to or participates in an enforced disappearance” should be held criminally responsible 207 . Under international criminal law, any person who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution” of a crime is “individually responsible for the crime.”208 This includes those who physically perpetrated the crime as well as those who jointly committed the crime or did so through another person.209 240. Both the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) and ad hoc tribunals have articulated theories of co-perpetration or joint action. The ICC has imposed criminal responsibility on individuals under Article 25(3)(a) for performing “an essential task in the joint commission of the crime”210. This concept of co-perpetration requires (a) the “existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons”, which “include[s] an element of 206 207 208 209 210 48 Please refer to Table D, Part I of this Annex. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, Article 6(1 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 1159, (1993), as amended by Security Council Resolution 1660 of 28 February 2006 (“ICTY Statute”), Art. 7(1); Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, (1994) 33 ILM 1602, as amended by Security Council Resolution of 26 March 2004 (“ICTR Statute”), Art. 6(1); see The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (“Celebici”), Case No. IT-96-21, Judgement, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 319-21 (finding that this constituted international customary law). Unlike the statutes constituting the ad hoc tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a hierarchy of responsibility under Article 25(3)(a)-(d). See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force 1 July 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9(1998) (“Rome Statute), Art. 25. The Special Rapporteur does not address this hierarchy and any differences with the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, particularly as to whether various levels of involvement represent different degrees of criminal responsibility. Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute covers “the notions of direct perpetration (commission of a crime in person), co-perpetration (commission of a crime jointly with another person) and indirect perpetration (commission of a crime through another person, regardless of whether the other person is criminally responsible).” The Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-trial Chamber 1, 29 January 2007, para. 318. Lachezar D. Yanev, Theories of Co-perpetration in International Criminal Law (Leiden, Brill I Nijhoff, Leiden, 2018), 32.