A/HRC/41/CRP.1 as a whole, as well as for global peace and security, have been the object of multiple studies and denunciation, including by Special Procedures. 469. As the inquiry into Mr. Khashoggi’s killing has highlighted, such implications are further compounded when the victims of such acts live in exile. The circumstances that triggered the human rights inquiry into the execution of Mr. Khashoggi, the many interviews conducted along with her research into the scale of the problem, have led the Special Rapporteur to conclude that this inquiry should not be a one-off. The United Nations should equip itself with the means and instruments to effectively investigate targeted killings and disappearances. The proposal that follows is offered as a preliminary reflection on what this means. 470. A Standing Investigatory and Accountability Mechanism is proposed that would have interrelated functions such as: (a) To investigate, in accordance with criminal law standards (international or national standards), allegations of targeted killing or disappearances by collecting and analysing evidence of such violations; (b) To facilitate strengthened judicial accountability, including by identifying possible avenues for the administration of justice at national, regional and international levels; (c) To prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings in accordance with international, regional or national law standards, in courts or tribunals that have, or may have in the future, jurisdiction over the crimes being investigated; (d) To identify other mechanisms for delivery of justice and ending impunity, including at political and diplomatic levels. 471. Such a standing instrument could be established through a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly or a resolution of the Human Rights Council. It could be activated by a member State in writing to the Secretary General or to the President of the Human Rights Council. 472. The Standing Instrument should be composed of independent international experts in investigations and prosecutions, as well as Special Procedures and Treaty-Bodies members. It could be supported by a secretariat that may be in use for other purposes such as that for the International Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIM) or the Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Secretariat should have operational and administrative autonomy and flexibility to allow for the realization of the Mandate of this instrument to be fully implemented. 94