A/HRC/13/42* page 13 12. A case falls within the scope of the present study on secret detention in the name of counter-terrorism only if State authorities or persons acting under the orders, or with the authorization, consent, support or acquiescence of the State, or in any other way attributable to the State, detain secretly persons: (a) Who have committed, or are suspected of planning, aiding or abetting, terrorist offences, irrespective of what classification of these offences is used by a Government; (b) In any situation where terrorism or related notions (such as extremism or separatism)6 are used to describe or justify the context in, or basis upon, which a person has been detained; (c) In any situation where extraordinary detention powers or procedures are triggered (under notions such as anti-terrorism acts, states of emergency or national security acts). 13. The qualification by States of certain acts as “terrorist acts” is often aimed at applying a special regime with limited legal and procedural safeguards in place. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has expressed concern that the absence of a universal and comprehensive definition of the term of “terrorism”, leaving it to individual States to define it carries the potential for unintended human rights abuses and even deliberate misuse of the term. He added that “it was essential to ensure that the term “terrorism” is confined in its use to conduct that is of a genuinely terrorist nature.”7 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention also noted with concern the frequent attempts by Governments to use normal legislation or to have recourse to emergency or special laws and procedures to combat terrorism and thereby permit, or at least increase, the risk of arbitrary detention. It added that such laws, either per se or in their application, by using an extremely vague and broad definition of terrorism, bring within their fold the innocent and the suspect alike, and thereby increase the risk of arbitrary detention, disproportionately reducing the level of guarantees enjoyed by ordinary persons in normal circumstances. Legitimate democratic opposition, as distinct from violent opposition, becomes a victim in the application of such laws.”8 Examples of such a type of criminal offence couched in broad terms relate to the subversion of State powers or simply anti-subversion laws”.9 Such 6 See, for instance, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, agreed upon in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The parties agree to “reciprocally recognize acts of terrorism, separatism and extremism irrespective of whether their own national legislations include the corresponding acts in the same category of crimes or whether they use the same terms to describe them”. 7 E/CN.4/2006/98, paras. 27 and 42. See also Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) and A/61/267, paras. 43-44, on the characteristics of recognizable genuine “terrorist acts”. 8 9 E/CN.4/1995/31, para. 25 (d). See also the following opinions and decisions of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: opinions No. 36/2006 (A/HRC/7/4/Add.1), No. 26/2003 (E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1), No. 15/2004