A/HRC/44/24 consequently undermining trust in the rule of law. 59 Other experts have recalled the importance of judicial control and proportionality when anonymity is lifted. 60 26. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has called for the prohibition of indiscriminate and untargeted surveillance of those exercising their right of peaceful assembly, in both physical and digital spaces. He underscored that surveillance of protesters should only be conducted on a targeted basis, and only when there is reasonable suspicion that they are engaging in or planning to engage in serious criminal offences, based on principles of necessity and proportionality and with judicial supervision.61 The General Assembly has also recognized that States should refrain from employing unlawful or arbitrary surveillance techniques, which could include forms of hacking.62 27. Despite these warnings, States continue to unduly resort to intrusive online surveillance and the hacking of the ICT tools used by those planning or organizing protests as well as protesters themselves. Surveillance software is used to infiltrate protesters smartphones, often after they are duped into downloading certain applications. These applications give unimpeded access to protesters’ phones and their contacts, chat messages, phone conversations, and photos and videos shared on social media and communication platforms. 63 Another cause for concern is the hacking of the social media accounts of protesters and organizers. Some State authorities use hacked devices to create false accounts to impersonate protest organizers and spread false information, or endanger followers, including through doxing (i.e., maliciously publishing personal information to encourage physical harm to protesters and organizers). 28. The monitoring of and interference with protesters’ use of mobile phones is another practice with considerable negative impacts on assemblies. Authorities use a variety of devices impersonating mobile phone traffic base stations to intercept mobile phone traffic and track the location of mobile phone users. These devices typically capture the International Mobile Subscriber Identity and the International Mobile Station Equipment Identifier of mobile phones, which are unique to each mobile phone and SIM card. International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers can be widespread, easy to transport, and can, in some cases, cover entire cities. Once connected to such a catcher, mobile phones reveal information that can identify their users. These catchers are often used to block or intercept data transmitted and received by mobile phones, including the content of calls, text messages and websites visited. In this way, such devices are used for the surveillance of individuals assembling or associating with others.64 This type of identity catcher can potentially capture the call activity of thousands of people. Awareness of this risk often has a disturbing effect on individuals, dissuading them from exercising their right to peaceful assembly in order to avoid having their communications recorded and monitored. 29. Online surveillance technologies and interference in communications often lead to harassment and intimidation. 65 For instance, International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers may be used to send messages to mobile phones in order to intimidate potential participants. These technologies have a chilling effect on demonstrations, as people fear subsequent reprisals for planning or participating in protests.66 In some countries, individuals who post information about protests or use social media to raise politically sensitive issues, face prosecution. As a result, protesters feel compelled to self-censor, keep a low social media 59 Ibid., paras. 36 and 59, and A/HRC/40/52/Add.1. See also www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24637&LangID=E. 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 8 Contribution of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression of the Organization of American States. A/HRC/41/41, para. 57. General Assembly resolution 73/179. Contribution of Access Now. Contribution of the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (INCLO). Ibid. Contribution of Defensoría del Pueblo de la Nación Argentina.