A/HRC/40/52 priority. Many humanitarian, human rights and development organizations have been forced to increase programme focus and activities in this area. Real risks follow of civil society being co-opted into a top-down agenda for political or security objectives. 118 E. Securitization 64. Severe risks of securitization or instrumentalization in development, education, good governance, democracy and human rights promotion abound when the prevention and countering of violent extremism agenda is layered into the comprehensive agenda set out in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Substantial risks ensue from further drawing humanitarian actors into a security-driven political agenda.119 The securitization of aid since 2001, the increased conflation of humanitarian and political agendas, notably where terrorism sanctions exist (Security Council resolution 1844 (2008)), and reporting requirements that involve humanitarian actors (Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)), as well as the increasing pressure for United Nations peace operations to engage more in counter-terrorism and prevention and countering of violent extremism, all have seriously underexamined consequences for humanitarian actors. F. Exclusion 65. It appears that those States engaging in repressive policies against civil society at the national level are aiming to spread those policies more broadly, actively working to silence criticism and opposition in international forums, including at the United Nations. This includes managing, denying and limiting civil society access to United Nations counterterrorism bodies, agencies, processes and meetings. Worryingly, some States are also using accusations of terrorism sympathies as a fast-track reason to exclude certain civil society members by closing applications for or forcing withdrawal of accreditation to the United Nations to silence them.120 G. Accountability vacuum 66. Despite the fact that measures adopted at all levels – from global to local – seriously affect civil society, there appears to be a complete lack of accountability for global violations that are occurring, and very few mechanisms that can call out State abuse and remedy the deep lacunae that have developed since 2001. 67. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) could play a mitigating role to diminish the impact that counter-terrorism matrices at the national level have on civil society, but has yet to do so forcefully. Positive developments include more consistent references to human rights in recent Council resolutions. However, it remains unclear how (if at all) the effect of counter-terrorism measures on civil society is monitored, how seriously the misapplication of the terrorism definition is addressed, and what, if any, process exists to curb State abuse of counter-terrorism measures against civil society actors and human rights defenders. 68. It is striking that despite the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s greater human rights commitment on paper, there has been a correlative increase in opacity. Country reports were publicly posted on its website until 2006, but have since become confidential. Security Council resolutions that seemingly increase transparency, such as resolution 2395 (2017), in which the Council directs the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to make a number of documents (excluding reports) available throughout the United Nations 118 119 120 18 Norwegian Refugee Council, Principles under Pressure. Ibid. International Service for Human Rights, “The backlash against civil society access and participation at the UN – Intimidation, restrictions and reprisals: 10 case studies” (2018).