A/HRC/40/52 I. Trends and patterns in the use of counter-terrorism measures against civil society actors and human rights defenders 1. Since 2001, civil society space has been shrinking around the globe. Civil society as a whole is frequently stigmatized and sometimes discriminated against, and its actors are subjected to smear campaigns, defamation and physical harassment, spuriously charged and sentenced under various laws. Their peaceful actions are often criminalized, and many members of civil society are simply unable to carry out their work because they have been detained, prosecuted, threatened or submitted to various restrictions on their ability to express themselves, to meet or to operate. The shrinking space for civil society is a structural global challenge. 2. According to CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, civic space is closed, repressed or obstructed in 111 countries across the world, and only 4 per cent of the global population live in areas where civic space is open.1 This trend has accelerated in recent years, with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law recording the adoption of 64 restrictive laws on civil society between the beginning of 2015 and into 2016 alone.2 According to Front Line: International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, at least 321 human rights defenders were killed in 2018.3 Other key violations contributing to the closing of civic space include detentions and arrests, legal action, intimidation, threats, smear campaigns and verbal abuse, physical attacks, excessive use of force, censorship and the adoption of restrictive legislation. 4 3. Between 2001 and 2018, at least 140 Governments adopted counter-terrorism legislation. 5 New and multiple legislative and administrative measures are defended by reference to new or perceived threats, or simply to comply with new international requirements. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 47 countries passed laws relating to foreign fighters between 2013 and 2017 – the largest wave of counter-terrorism measures since the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001.6 4. The link between security frameworks and assaults on civil society can be seen in the following trends and figures. Since the mandate’s inception in 2005, 66 per cent of all relevant communications sent by the mandate holders have related to the use on civil society of counter-terrorism laws and policies and prevention and countering of violent extremism or broadly defined security-related measures. This is an extraordinarily high proportion, which underscores the abuse and misuse of counter-terrorism measures against civil society and human rights defenders since 2005. 7 In 2017–2018, the proportion was slightly higher, at 68 per cent. This robust empirical finding measured from 2005 to 2018 affirms that the targeting of civil society is not a random or incidental aspect of counterterrorism law and practice. It suggests the hard-wiring of misuse into counter-terrorism measures taken by States around the globe. This upward trend seen in the mandate’s data tallies with the findings of Mapping Media Freedom that the misuse of security legislation to silence government critics is growing, with 67 of the 269 cases it received in a four-year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 “People power under attack: a global analysis of threats to fundamental freedoms” (2018). “Survey of trends affecting civic space: 2015-16”, Global Trends in NGO Law, vol. 7, No. 4 (2016). “Front Line Defenders Global analysis 2018” (2019). Civicus, “People power”, and Front Line: International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, “Global analysis 2018”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Counterterrorism Measures and Civil Society: Changing the Will, Finding the Way (2018). Letta Tayler, “Overreach: how new global counterterrorism measures jeopardize rights” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This percentage excludes communications relating to legal technical advice on draft or adopted legislation or standards, as well as standard communications about the repatriation and trial of foreign fighters and on the follow up to the joint global study, and institutional communications to the United Nations. The figures reflect only the cases that have been submitted directly to the Special Rapporteur. Methodologically, the figures likely reflect substantial underreporting.