A/HRC/10/3 page 24 they have participated in such violations. States retain this positive obligation to protect human rights where they grant privileges within their national territory to another State, including to intelligence services. B. Recommendations For legislative assemblies 65. The Special Rapporteur recommends that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence by an intelligence agency should be authorized by provisions of law that are particularly precise, proportionate to the security threat, and offer effective guarantees against abuse. States should ensure that competent authorities apply less intrusive investigation methods than special investigation techniques if such methods enable a terrorist offence to be detected, prevented or prosecuted with adequate effectiveness. Decision-making authority should be layered so that the greater the invasion of privacy, the higher the level of necessary authorization. Furthermore, in order to safeguard against the arbitrary use of special investigative techniques and violations of human rights, the use of special investigative techniques by the intelligence agencies must be subject to appropriate supervision and review. 66. There should be a domestic legal basis for the storage and use of data by intelligence and security services, which is foreseeable as to its effects and subject to scrutiny in the public interest. The law should also provide for effective controls on how long information may be retained, the use to which it may be put, and who may have access to it, and ensure compliance with international data protection principles in the handling of information. There should be audit processes, which include external independent personnel, to ensure that such rules are adhered to. 67. The Special Rapporteur also recommends the adoption of legislation that clarifies the rights, responsibilities, and liability of private companies in submitting data to government agencies. 68. Parliamentary oversight committees, ad hoc parliamentary inquiry committees, royal commissions, etc. should have far-reaching investigative powers, access to the archives and registers, premises, and installations of the executive and the agency, in order to fulfil their domestic oversight function. These bodies should also be able to proactively investigate the relationship of a domestic agency with a particular State or service, or all exchanges of information with foreign cooperating services pertaining to a particular case. After their inquiry these bodies should produce simultaneously a confidential report for the executive and a separate report for public disclosure. 69. The Special Rapporteur supports the recommendation of the Eminent Jurist Panel on Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism and Human Rights that intelligence agencies should not perform the functions of law enforcement personnel.80 If, despite the potential for abuse, 80 Eminent Jurist Panel on Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism and Human Rights, 2009, forthcoming report, chapter IV, part 5.