A/HRC/44/47 prosecution services is influenced, neutralized or co-opted by circumstances unrelated to the exercise of their professional activities, a culture of impunity develops. 72. There is no single system or model that can shield public prosecution services from the impact of corrupt practices.49 While it is true that corruption tends to be prevalent in those countries where the concepts of separation of powers and the independence and integrity of judges and prosecutors are less entrenched, it is the view of the Special Rapporteur that the margin of discretion that prosecutors have in interpreting and resolving issues within their competence makes them a prized target for corruption. 73. Some countries, for example, have specialized units to process any complaints received and, where appropriate, recommend their closure or dismissal. 50 These units can only carry out their work effectively if there is a protocol in place and appropriate oversight of cases that are dismissed. Otherwise, their work might be used as an excuse to obtain undue incentives and create opportunities for corruption within the prosecution services. 51 74. Persons who are willing to put their personal, group or partisan interests before those that should govern the public prosecution service pose a danger to its proper functioning and, by extension, to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Where the public prosecution service is subordinate to the executive branch, guarantees against external pressure are all the more necessary in order to shield it from undue political influence. 52 75. Several prosecution services reported that they had ethics or good governance codes or commissions in place to ensure the full, efficient and transparent management of the work of prosecutors, in addition to guidelines on ethical behaviour and conflicts of interest designed to help identify, investigate and, where appropriate, punish cases of unreported conflicts of interest, as well as violations of the principles of justice, integrity, impartiality, non-abuse of power, independence, confidentiality and respect for the law. Despite significant progress, however, a large number of prosecution services still have no ethics commission or code in place. 76. Prevention programmes. Strategies for preventive and disciplinary monitoring plans have been designed and implemented in several public prosecution services to identify, investigate and punish possible acts of corruption within prosecution services. A noteworthy example in this regard is the “Bolsillos de Cristal” strategy used in Colombia and which is designed to ensure transparency in the conduct of public officials. The purpose of the strategy is to eradicate high-profile corruption practices, including in the administration of justice, which naturally includes judges, judicial services centres, prosecution services and the judicial police. 77. Procedural manuals. Some prosecution services have also developed manuals for the investigation of corruption offences and guidelines on ethical behaviour and conflicts of interest, as well as good practices for internal work dynamics and the safeguarding of information and filing systems. Among the principles that guide the activity of prosecutors are justice, integrity, impartiality, non-abuse of power, independence, confidentiality and respect for the law. 78. Declaration of assets and interests. In some jurisdictions, in order to comply with the obligations set out in article 11 of the Convention, prosecutors are required to declare their own assets and interests, as well as those of their spouse or partner and children. In order to build confidence in public prosecution services, Member States need to make greater commitments to transparency with regard to prosecutors’ assets. 79. Internal oversight. In the fight against corruption, it is essential to create special prosecutor’s offices for the investigation, prosecution and punishment of corruption-related 49 50 51 52 GE.20-04343 Owing to the confidential nature of the information received by the Special Rapporteur, it is not possible to name particular countries. For example, Chile has a unit that handles non-complex cases, and Guatemala has a fast-track processing unit. Fundación para la Justicia y el Estado Democrático de Derecho, Due Process of Law Foundation and Justice Studies Center of the Americas, Estándares internacionales sobre la autonomía de los fiscales y las fiscalías, Mexico, 2017, p. 38, available at http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/ estandares_fiscales_diagramacion_v3.pdf. Venice Commission, CDL-AD (2010)040, para. 83. 13