A/HRC/23/39 36. For instance, the obligation for associations to route funding through state channels; to report on all funds received from foreign sources and how these are allocated or used (e.g. Kyrgyz Republic); to obtain authorization from the authorities to receive or use funds (e.g. Jordan, Sudan) all constitute human rights violations. In some cases, not only does legislation providing for an authorization procedure not comply with international law, but the implementation of such strict provisions is also problematic For example, in Bangladesh, a human rights association encountered arbitrary delays greatly in excess of the legal 45-day period before receiving a response to an application for project approval from the NGO Affairs Bureau; in Egypt, a women rights association was granted approval for funding seven months after its request, which was far beyond the 60 days prescribed by law. In some other cases (e.g. Azerbaijan, Uganda, Zimbabwe), activists were subject to intimidation and sometimes physical assault aimed at forcing them to provide the names of their funding partners. 37. Fundamentally, the Special Rapporteur believes that associations should be accountable to their donors, and at most, subject by the authorities to a mere notification procedure of the reception of funds and the submission of reports on their accounts and activities. 38. The transparency and accountability argument has, in some other cases, been used to exert extensive scrutiny over the internal affairs of associations, as a way of intimidation and harassment. The Special Rapporteur warns against frequent, onerous and bureaucratic reporting requirements, which can eventually unduly obstruct the legitimate work carried out by associations. Controls need therefore to be fair, objective and non-discriminatory, and not be used as a pretext to silence critics. Composition of the supervisory body also needs to be independent from the executive power to ensure its decisions are not arbitrary. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that if an association fails to comply with its reporting obligations, such minor violation of the law should not lead to the closure of the association (e.g. Belarus) or criminal prosecution of its representative (e.g. Egypt); rather, the association should be requested to promptly rectify its situation. Only this approach corresponds to the spirit and the letter of freedom of association. 4. Aid effectiveness and funding control 39. International development cooperation between States has greatly increased in recent years and has allowed for advancing global development. To ensure the quality of aid, more collaborative approaches have now emerged. The Aid Effectiveness Agenda of the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) are implementation frameworks aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of aid. They have gradually required harmonization of donor initiatives and accountability of development partners, but also required partner States to take ownership of aid initiatives. Nevertheless, in some cases, the principles identified within this framework (namely, ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability) have been interpreted by some States as giving them the sole power to determine priorities and subsequently control the plans of CSOs, thereby justifying limitations over the activities of civil society actors, including their right to seek and use foreign funding. While an inclusive and participatory process towards aid is to be welcomed, a rights-based approach is needed to ensure civil society’s access to funding is not unduly restricted. 40. The Special Rapporteur highlights that coordination of aid is not listed as a legitimate ground for restrictions under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, he underlines that barriers in the name of aid effectiveness have little in common with “the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre 12