A/HRC/40/45 8. Following a campaign of targeted attacks against voter registration centres and other election-related targets, Afghanistan’s long-awaited parliamentary elections took place on 20, 21 and 27 October. During these three days, UNAMA documented more civilian casualties than on any previous election days since the Mission began systematic documentation in 2009. Throughout the voter registration period and on the election days, anti-government elements, mainly Taliban, targeted civilian objects used for electionrelated purposes, including schools and mosques. These acts of violence involved the use of tactics aimed directly at the civilian population as part of a deliberate campaign intended to disrupt and undermine the electoral process and prevent people from exercising their right to political participation. III. Protection of civilians 9. During the reporting period, civilian deaths and injuries remained at the same high levels as in 2017. Conflict-related violence also continued to destroy livelihoods, homes and property, displaced thousands of families, and restricted access to health, education and other services. The conflict had a severe impact on women and children. UNAMA/OHCHR consistently documented the combination of suicide attacks and non-suicide improvised explosive devices as the leading causes of civilian casualties, followed by ground engagements. Civilian casualties attributed to anti-government elements continued to increase and represented by far the highest percentage of the overall civilian casualties during the reporting period, while the number of civilian casualties attributed to progovernment forces also increased by 17 per cent compared with the same period in 2017. 10. From 1 January to 30 November, UNAMA/OHCHR documented 10,269 civilian casualties (3,464 deaths and 6,805 injured). It attributed 65 per cent of these casualties to anti-government elements and 22 per cent to pro-government forces (comprising the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, pro-government armed groups and international military forces). Ground engagements between anti-government elements and pro-government forces where responsibility could not be attributed to a specific party to the conflict accounted for 10 per cent of civilian casualties. The remaining 3 per cent resulted mainly from explosive remnants of war that could not be attributed to any party to the conflict. 11. UNAMA/OHCHR documented increases in civilian casualties in all regions of Afghanistan except the central highlands and the southern and western regions. 12. The decrease in civilian casualties caused by ground engagements and explosive remnants of war was more than offset by a 28 per cent increase in civilian casualties from suicide and complex 1 attacks and a 40 per cent increase in casualties caused by aerial strikes. The rise in civilian casualties resulting from complex and suicide attacks occurred mainly in the eastern and central regions. The eastern region recorded a ten-fold increase in civilian casualties from such attacks, mainly in Nangarhar. Casualties from aerial attacks increased in all regions except the southern and western regions and the central highlands. 13. ISIL-Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for 38 incidents that caused 1,752 civilian casualties (514 deaths and 1,238 injured), nearly double the number of casualties claimed by the group in 2017. Of these, 1,631 casualties resulted from suicide and complex attacks. 14. UNAMA/OHCHR recorded 1,003 civilian casualties from violence related to the parliamentary elections. The Mission recorded 479 civilian casualties (64 deaths and 415 injured) during the three days of polling, with the rest of the casualties occurring during pre-election activities between 14 April and 19 October. 1 A deliberate and coordinated attack which includes a suicide device (i.e. body-borne improvised explosive device or suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), more than one attacker and more than one type of device (i.e. body-borne improvised explosive device and mortars). All three elements must be present for an attack to be considered complex. 3