A/HRC/43/59 control the administration of the areas in which they operated and engage in profitgenerating activities – including the narcotic industry.6 The Tatmadaw-drafted 2008 Constitution states that “all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defence service”.7 Accordingly, from 2009 to 2010, the Tatmadaw attempted to transform EAOs into pro-government militia, namely People’s Militia Forces (PMF) and Border Guard Forces (BGF). This contributed to the breakdown of several long-standing bilateral ceasefire agreements. 8 However, several progovernment militias, EAOs with bilateral ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw and anti-government EAOs in Myanmar’s conflict areas did become PMFs and BGFs. In a continuation of the policy initiated under General Ne Win, rather than being provided with funds from the military budget, BGFs and PMFs are allowed to control territory and conduct their own profit-generating activities within it, while they perform security duties and if necessary fight alongside the Tatmadaw. 9 There also remains many militias that are not PMF or BGF but are allied to the Tatmadaw, operate under its command and supervision, and are authorised to conduct their own profit-generating activities within designated territory. 10 B. Conflict areas Shan State has long been a global epicentre of illicit drug production. It was the primary global source of opium and heroin for decades and is now the centre of a massive regional methamphetamine production and trafficking industry, linked to transnational criminal organisations.11 By 2019, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the Southeast Asian methamphetamine market could value up to USD $61.4 billion annually, and the heroin market around USD $10.3 billion. 12 Sites of drug production on an industrial scale need to remain hidden and inaccessible to law enforcement or others who may scrutinise them. With many areas under the control of Tatmadaw allied militia and BGF, and large enclaves under the full territorial control of EAOs that have bilateral ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw, much of Shan State provides the necessary environment for mass synthetic drug production and trafficking. 13 After the 17-year long ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Tatmadaw broke down in 2011, some armed groups that had splintered off from the KIA transformed into BGF and PMF. For example, the Kachin Defence Army became a PMF and the New Democratic Army – Kachin became several BGF units.14 Civil society groups report that the increased number of PMF and BGF has corresponded with a rise in the production, distribution and sale of narcotics in Kachin State. 15 Since 2008 as many as fifteen separate BGF battalions have been established in Kayah and Kayin States.16 Again, civil society report this period as having corresponded with an increase in production, distribution and sale of narcotics in those States. Tatmadaw allied militia, such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army also hold territory and are 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 For more information see “A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State” by the Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2018. Constitution section 338. Buchanan, 2016, “Silent Offensive How Burma Army strategies are fuelling the Kachin drug crisis” by the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), 2014. Buchanan, 2016. Buchanan, 2016. ICG, 2019. UNODC, 2019. ICG, 2019. KWAT, 2014. KWAT, 2014. Buchanan, 2016. 25