A/HRC/13/47 especially with the huge food shortages in the mid-1990s, due to natural disasters coupled with mismanagement on the part of the authorities. The regime then started to accept international food aid, and between 2000 and 2004 it cautiously experimented with a market system whereby people were allowed to trade and earn their own keep, especially as the State did not wish to allocate enough of its own resources for this purpose. In this context, the State was, and still is, stepping up its militarization drive. 15. The World Food Programme (WFP) has been a major conduit for multilateral food aid to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and there has also been periodically bilateral aid from neighbouring and other countries. Yet, in 2009 bilateral aid from the United States of America was stalled by the authorities of the recipient country, and American non-governmental organizations working on food distribution in the country were asked to leave. This seems to have been due to the authorities’ rejection of closer monitoring procedures and of the potential use of Korean-speaking interpreters from outside the country (which would have ensured more balanced translation of answers from respondents in the monitoring process). 16. The situation concerning food shortages in 2009 (with impact on 2010) remains severe. Although there was a slightly better harvest on some fronts in 2008 due to more favourable weather conditions, the harvests in 2009 were less satisfactory due to drought in some parts and a shortage of fertilizers. Food aid has thus been an essential mainstay for the general population since the mid-1990s and is still pertinent today. Citing the report on the crop and food security assessment mission jointly conducted in October 2008 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and WFP, the latter indicated that: The total gross production came to only 4.21 million metric tons (unmilled, 3.3 million tons milled) of cereal equivalent, as agricultural production was severely constrained by lack of fertilizer and fuel, declining soil fertility and structural factors. Even with anticipated commercial imports and currently pledged food aid, the country will experience a cereal shortfall of 836,000 tons for the 2008/09 marketing year, leaving 8.7 million people in need of food assistance.5 17. In 2008, WFP initiated an emergency relief programme targeted to cover 6.2 million people, mainly children, pregnant and lactating women and the elderly. However, due to a shortfall of aid, influenced most probably by the world community’s disapproval of the country’s nuclearization process, the organization was able to help fewer than 2 million people in 2009. It was reported that, starting in June 2008, WFP would refocus its programme in 62 counties in six provinces instead of the 131 counties (eight provinces) originally targeted under the emergency operation. Depending upon the resources received, WFP would be able to feed up to 1.88 million people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, mainly young children in institutions, pregnant and lactating women and the elderly.6 18. The principle of “no access, no food” is adhered to. While the monitoring is more constrained than in the past (7 days’ notice rather than the previous 24-hour notice), it is still quasi-random, as once permission is given by the authorities monitors can choose where to visit without having to inform the authorities of all the details. However, the authorities still do not permit Korean-speaking interpreters from outside the country to be involved. The most food insecure part of the country remains the north-east. It is also essential to stress that the problem is not simply food shortage but distorted food distribution, from which the elite benefits. 5 6 GE.10-10793 See www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk. See www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk. 7