A/HRC/13/47 19. While WFP finished its midterm review of the emergency relief operation in 2009, the authorities have refused to let the agency conduct a crop and food security assessment for the 2009 period, even though, like the one in 2008, such an assessment would be very useful for planning and responding to the issue of food security and access to vulnerable populations. There is thus an issue of transparency. 20. Logically, it would seem that if the authorities are not able to satisfy the basic needs of the people, the people should be able to participate in activities which can help generate income, and thereby produce or buy their own food as well as sustain their livelihood. Yet, in 2005 the State began to clamp down on the market system that had developed between 2000 and 2004 and to reimpose its control over the population and revert to the public distribution system. The irony is that the system has been dysfunctional for a long time and cannot hope to satisfy the basic food needs of the population. A recent study divides up the population into five groups for food rationing: priority 1, high-level government officials; priority 2, security and law enforcement personnel; priority 3, workers at industrial units; priority 4, other general workers and residents; priority 5, farmers.7 Currently, the fourth and fifth groups are in dire straits. 21. In 2009, other draconian measures had a negative impact on the general population seeking to make ends meet. The authorities started to prohibit small plot farming and closed markets where people had previously traded their wares.8 Farmers were also reported to be suffering from the military pilfering or extorting a share of the farm produce.9 At the end of the year, the authorities imposed a currency revaluation, redenominating the won. As a result, 1 (new) won is equivalent to 100 old won; two zeroes were automatically lobbed off all financial holdings and savings, much to the distress of the population.10 This was a push to curb the market system, to compel those holding on to the old currency to exchange it for the new, and to control the circulation of money in the process.11 There are also measures to punish those who try to dispose of the old cash clandestinely. 22. In early 2010, another measure was introduced to prohibit the use of foreign currency in the market and in trade, and to impose the new local currency on both foreigners and locals.12 23. Throughout the past six years, the Special Rapporteur has emphasized that while food aid is important, another important consideration is food security, at times under the rubric of disaster preparedness, mitigation and/or management. Food security is linked closely to sustainable agriculture, environmental conservation, and people’s participation in generating and benefiting from the food. It is thus welcome that the United Nations Development Programme has now returned to the country and will resume some of the activities in relation to food security which it was on the verge of initiating before it had to withdraw from the country in 2007, such as reduction of post-harvest losses (see DP/2009/8, para. 6). 7 8 9 10 11 12 8 Pomnyun Sunim, “Humanitarian aid to North Korea: how to approach it?”, unpublished paper, 15 October 2009, p. 2. See North Korea Today, No. 288, August 2009 and No. 305, November 2009, available from http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.com/. Ibid., Nos. 302 and 304, November 2009. Ibid., Nos. 307/308–310, December 2009. Hyeong Jung Park, “Impact and outlook of currency exchange in North Korea”, online series (Seoul, Korea Institute of National Unification, 17 December 2009). “North Korea bans foreign currency use”, Bangkok Post, 1 January 2010, p. 9. GE.10-10793