A/HRC/42/CRP.1 lack of income. I have another son, about whom I don’t know anything. The neighbourhood knows about my situation and everyone tries to help in their own way. Most of the time we are hungry, we beg for people to feed us. At the time of the airstrikes and the clashes we sit together and cry with my remaining three children. I spend my day trying to provide some food for my children, by any means possible.”925 F. Al-Mahra (2018 – 2019) 1. Context 602. Al-Mahra Governorate is located at Yemen’s eastern border with Oman. It has largely been spared the impact of the conflict because of its geographic and political isolation. Deserts, mountains and a prevailing tribal system kept al-Mahra distant from past and ongoing social and political upheavals. 603. In the current conflict, local authorities sided with the Government and supported the coalition’s intervention. At the same time, until recently, Mahris had managed to maintain the pre-existing social and political fabric. However, al-Mahra’s economic and political endurance has been tested by the intervention of members of the coalition at separate times in the last five years. First, the UAE, and then the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council, attempted to gain a military or political foothold in the governorate without success. These attempts were followed by efforts by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to achieve greater control in al-Mahra; such efforts were ongoing at the time of writing, with the stated official rationale being to counter the alleged smuggling of weapons through al-Mahra.926 604. Saudi Arabia’s endeavours to wield influence in the governorate have brought about important changes. According to local sources, the Saudi forces gained the support of parts of some tribes within the governorate, which, in exchange, have received weapons and training to support the anti-smuggling and wider security efforts.927 Additionally, the Saudi forces set up proxy forces, which reportedly do not have any official link with the local authorities, and whose manpower comes from neighbouring southern governorates. 928 The Saudis also converted the al-Ghaydah airport into a military base, reportedly in contravention of pledges made to the local authorities. The arrival of the Saudis was accompanied by President Hadi’s appointment of a new Governor, Rajeh Bakrit, who is perceived to be more aligned with Saudi plans for the area. He arrived in al-Mahra on 1 January 2018. 605. The Saudi forces’ impact on al-Mahra has been met by opposition from various segments of the population, which has caused a simmering political crisis, as illustrated by various demonstrations throughout the governorate. In response to dissent, the Saudi forces and their Yemeni counterparts have committed human rights violations. The Group of Experts is concerned that the ongoing efforts by Saudi Arabia to expand its hold in the province may lead to further deterioration of the human rights situation. 2. Killing of Demonstrators 13 November 2018 606. Tribesmen in al-Mahra Governorate have staged a number of public protests against the Saudi presence since November 2017.929 There have also been a number of armed 925 Testimony from a relative of a victim; identifying information has been withheld for protection reasons. 926 See Al-Arabiya TV station report alleging that weapons were being smuggled to the Houthi movement via al-Mahra’s coast (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hae8NW1grRQ). 927 http://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7606 and Confidential Sources on File. 928 http://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7606 and Confidential Sources on File. 929 Confidential Sources on File. 145