A/HRC/42/CRP.1 796. The devaluation of the Yemeni Rial has been exacerbated by the continuous printing of money by the Government of Yemen.1279 A series of cash injections from Saudi Arabia helped stabilize the exchange rate, but black market exchange rates still hover well above the official rate.1280 Exaggerated currency exchange rates on the black market have been further sustained by the relocation of the Central Bank from Sana’a to Aden by the Government of Yemen in September 2016. Indeed, its relocation left the Central Bank considerably weaker nationally, as it became unable to play the role of economic stabilizer.1281 This also incited Yemenis to rely on informal money transfer systems, 1282 further contributing to the black market and the corruption prevailing in the war economy.1283 The relocation also undermined the National Bank’s credibility at the international level.1284 797. As a most tangible consequence, the relocation of the Central Bank by the Government of Yemen led to the non-payment of salaries of hundreds of thousands of governmental civil servants, including teachers and medical personnel, working in areas controlled by the de facto authorities. On 23 September 2016, President Hadi had acknowledged before the United Nations General Assembly that the relocation of the Central Bank from Sana’a to Aden might result in a failure to pay the salaries of public sector employees.1285 In May 2019, the Sana’a Centre reported that hundreds of thousands of civil servants had not received regular salaries for three years, i.e. since the relocation of the Central Bank.1286 In May 2019, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry emphasized that the non-payment of salaries to employees has been one of the most significant factors deepening the economic and humanitarian crisis in Yemen. 1287 On 29 September 2016, the International Crisis Group had already warned that “[e]fforts to move Yemen’s Central Bank will likely add to risks of insolvency and starvation”. 1288 798. The governmental tax revenue system has collapsed, as the de facto authorities have reportedly been pursuing aggressive tax collection practices to fund war efforts. 1289 These additional financial constraints on the Yemeni population deepened the humanitarian crisis, 1279 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Yemen (Feb. 19, 2019) quoted in Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service (Mar. 21, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf at 13. 1280 See, for example, https://shilfa.com/saudi/exchange-rates-in-yemen-now-the-price-of-the-dollarand-the-saudi-rial-on-wednesday-29-5-2019/ 1281 Mansour Rageh, Amal Nasser, and Farea Al-Muslimi, “Yemen Without a Functioning Central Bank: The Loss of Basic Economic Stabilization and Accelerating Famine”, Sana’a Centre for Strategic Strategies (Nov. 2, 2016), http://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/55. 1282 Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Camilla Cimatti, “Counter-terrorism, de-risking and the humanitarian response in Yemen: a call for action”, Humanitarian Policy Group (2018) at 10. 1283 While Yemen was one of the lowest scoring countries in Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) prior to the current conflict, its score has further dropped since 2014; Yemen is currently ranked 176 out of the 180 countries. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018”, Transparency International (2018): https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#results.); see also, for example, as regards corruption networks: http://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/6732; http://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy_policy_brief_9.pdf. 1284 Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy and Camilla Cimatti, “Counter-terrorism, de-risking and the humanitarian response in Yemen: a call for action”, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2018. 1285 President Hadi stated, “We might fail to pay the salaries of people working in public service.” 71 st Session of the General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2016), https://gadebate.un.org/en/71/yemen. 1286 Spencer Osberg and Hannah Patchett, “An Unending Fast: What the Failure of the Amman Meeting Means for Yemen”, Sana’a Centre for Strategic Strategies (May 20, 2019), http://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7433. 1287 “Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry: Non-Payment of Salaries Most Important Reason for Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen”, Almasirah Media Network (May 5, 2019), https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=6930&cat_id=1. 1288 International Crisis Group, “Central Bank Crisis Risks Famine in Yemen”, 29 September 2016 (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/centralbank-crisis-risks-famine-yemen) 1289 Peter Salisbury, “Bickering While Yemen Burns: Poverty, War, and Political Indifference,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 22, 2017, at 10. https://agsiw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/Salisbury_Yemen_ONLINE.pdf. 191