A/HRC/42/CRP.1 83. The same reasoning applies to other non-State armed groups operating within Yemen, which are bound by human rights law if they exercise control over certain areas of the Yemeni territory. This was for example the case when AQAP temporarily gained territorial control of parts of the Hadramaut coast in 2015. 84. Denying such obligations would effectively create a protection gap for the populations living under the control of non-State entities, particularly for actions that are not directly linked to the conflict and hence not covered by international humanitarian law, including fundamental freedoms and economic, social and cultural rights. 67 85. The existence of human rights obligations of the coalition with regard to Yemen presupposes the extraterritorial application of international human rights law. Indeed, it has been established that the scope of application of international human rights law does not only depend on a State’s territorial limits, but also on the exercise of its jurisdiction or effective control, even if not situated in that State’s sovereign territory.68 While certain States deny that their armed forces are bound by international human rights law when operating abroad69, it would be difficult to deny such extraterritorial application if those foreign forces have some level of control over a person, area or facility. Within the context of Yemen, this might for instance be relevant with regard to centres of detention and/or military bases that are under the authority of a member of the coalition, essentially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Also, foreign States operating in the territory of another State on that State’s invitation are bound by the international human rights law obligations of the host State. IV. A. Cooperation with the Group of Eminent Experts Cooperation during the first mandate September 2017 – August 2018 86. In 2018, following its creation by the Human Right Council in resolution 36/31, the Group of Experts and members of the secretariat were granted access to Yemen, and carried out visits to Aden, Sana’a, Sa’dah and al-Hudaydah. 87. Significant security, logistical and administrative constraints prevented planned visits to other affected governorates, notably Ta’izz. The planned mission to Ta’izz in 2018 was cancelled following increased security restrictions imposed by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security after the killing of an ICRC staff member in Ta’izz in April 2018. 88. Thanks to the cooperation of the parties to the conflict and countries hosting displaced Yemenis, in 2018 visits were also undertaken to Djibouti, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Group of Experts also visited Switzerland for meetings with representatives of relevant states and organisations and in order to present its findings to the Human Rights Council. 89. The Group of Experts is grateful to all who helped to facilitate its work during its first mandate. B. Cooperation during the second mandate September 2018 – August 2019 90. Following the release of the first report of the Group of Experts in August 2018, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Government of Yemen, and other members of 67 In some situations, non-State armed groups have declared their commitment to international human rights law, possibly also to gain legitimacy. 68 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para. 109. 69 S. Casey-Maslen, G. Giacca, Dr. A. Bellal, “International law and armed non-State actors in Afghanistan”, International Review of the Red Cross, 31 March 2011 (https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/international-law-and-armed-non-state-actorsafghanistan), p. 18 (with references). 22