A/HRC/42/CRP.1 2017.592 The Group examined patterns where the de facto authorities used restrictions on fundamental freedoms and arbitrary detention as a means of repression, and to establish a “police state” environment within the areas under their control. A large number of sources, including witnesses and victims, expressed immense fear over engaging with the Group of Experts, as the risks to their lives and families seemed worryingly real. For Yemenis living in Sana’a and in other areas under the control of the de facto authorities, this fear has become a part of their daily lives. 383. Since the end of 2014, the de-facto authorities have reportedly raided, looted and closed the premises of more than 50 human rights and civil society organizations. 593 Many activists, opponents and critics have been forced to leave Sana’a for fear of reprisals. Some of these people sought refuge abroad while others fled to other parts of the country under the control of the Government of Yemen. Those remaining in Sana’a, as well as some of those who fled but maintained family links in Sana’a, have adopted self-censorship out of fear and as a means of protecting their lives and those of their loved ones. 594 By 2019, Sana’a had come to resemble a monolithic state controlled by fear or indoctrination, with no tolerance for dissent in any perceived form. 384. From September 2014, the Houthi Popular Committees reportedly seized control of the State-owned media, raided TV channels, newspapers offices and radio stations. They blocked 21 news websites, censored seven television channels and banned 18 newspapers from publication.595 Approximately 30 newspapers were suspended or forced to close down.596 Some media outlets preferred to close down rather than lose their independence. Journalists and media workers linked to the al-Islah party were widely targeted including through raids, looting of their homes and arbitrary arrests. 597 By June 2019, media outlets broadcasting from Sana’a were either loyal to the de-facto authorities’ ideology or were forced to work under the strict control of the authorities. Reports further mention that some websites were blocked in 2018 through the Houthi control of the Ministry of Communication and the internet service provider YemenNet. Restrictions on the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression “The situation for myself and many Yemeni journalists not aligned with the Houthis became very difficult in September 2014 and even worse with the start of the coalition campaign in 2015. The Houthis wanted to shut any mouth supporting the coalition or not opposing it.”598 Journalist living in exile 385. The Group of Experts investigated 30 cases of journalists and media workers detained as a result of the exercise of their right to freedom of opinion and expression. While investigations covered cases of detention of journalists dating back to the early days of the conflict, the Group of Experts focused specifically on cases of ongoing detention or those that occurred in 2018 and onwards which demonstrated the continuing patterns of freedom of opinion and expression restrictions in Sana’a. Some were working for media aligned with the political opposition while others were working for media outlets critical of the de facto authorities. Many were detained in the early stages of the conflict. According to one journalist, even prior to taking control of Sana’a, the Houthis had already identified journalists who had been vocal against them: “They were well organized early on”, the journalist told the Group of Experts. “They already knew who to target or punish once they reached Sana’a”. Of these cases, one (male journalist) was seriously injured during his For further details on this case, see section on Targeting of General People’s Congress (GPC) Affiliates 2017-2019 below. 593 United Nations, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of human rights in Yemen, 13 September 2017, A/HRC/36/33(hereinafter ‘UN Human Rights Yemen Report 2017 - A/HRC/36/33’), p. 14. 594 Confidential Sources on File. 595 UN Human Rights Yemen Report 2017 - A/HRC/36/33, p. 14. 596 Confidential Sources on File. 597 Confidential Sources on File. 598 Confidential Sources on File. 592 94