A/HRC/14/24 8. But, for the practice to live up to the theory, it is essential to take stock of how the system functions in reality and to identify needed reforms. While I have noted in past years that response rates from Governments were poor,1 the present wrap-up report provides an opportunity to better understand general trends and patterns in communications and Government responses during the whole term of my mandate. A systematic review of communications is contained in annex II. In brief, from December 2004 to March 2009, 523 communications were sent to 87 States, concerning over 6,250 individuals. About half of these drew no response at all, while a quarter drew largely satisfactory responses. 9. Of the 15 countries that received the most communications, 7 failed to respond to more than 50 per cent of letters sent: India (no reply to 16 of 18 letters), Iraq (11 of 14 letters), the Sudan (12 of 16 letters), Saudi Arabia (16 of 22 letters), the United States of America (12 of 18 letters), Brazil (8 of 13 letters), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (37 of 63 letters). 10. It is clear that there is a need to consider how to make the procedure more effective both in engaging States in dialogue and bringing relief in individual cases. The importance of communications within the overall context of the Special Procedures system has grown immensely, but without any real planning or strategic vision. It would now be timely to consider what such a procedure should ideally look like in the twenty-first century. Six steps could usefully be taken. 11. First, there should be an examination of the effectiveness of communications.2 Ideally, this would be based on a major review of allegations received, communications sent, responses provided and achievements registered as a result. It would encompass all relevant mandates. Such a review would provide an informative picture of the responsiveness of Governments to the procedures they have set up through the medium of the Council. And it would assist in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the system as a whole, thus enabling clearer identification of the reforms needed. 12. The second step should be to move towards a better integrated system, which would bring together the efforts made by a myriad of individual mandate holders so that they would look more like a system. At present the procedures for determining when to send communications are uneven, there is no shared vision of the optimal approach, and there is no comprehensive strategic plan to develop the system. As a result, there is a strong sense that the wealth of information that is being generated by the relatively disparate procedures is not being effectively capitalized upon. 13. A third step is to update the techniques and technology being used to send, receive and manage communications. For example, it can no longer be appropriate to send the vast majority of communications to States by fax. Apart from the labour costs, the communications charges, the time lost, the reliance on a relatively primitive technology, and the difficulty of keeping track of such correspondence, faxing generally renders the content difficult to manage electronically and thus undermines all sorts of time- and costsaving possibilities. While a full overhaul might require a broader reform of diplomatic communications strategies, there is no reason why significant changes could not be introduced immediately. Moreover, there is a need for a web-based database accessible to all mandate holders so that information can be shared in a far more efficient manner, priorities discussed, changes introduced more flexibly, and the overall situation can be monitored with ease at any given time. In addition, the publication of unwieldy printed 1 2 4 A/HRC/11/2, para. 7; A/HRC/8/3, para. 7; A/HRC/4/20, para. 9; E/CN.4/2006/53, para. 12; and E/CN.4/2005/7, para. 21. Government responsiveness is only one factor. Letters never responded to could still affect the behaviour of a Government or other actor. Other intangible impacts may also be difficult to measure.