A/HRC/36/44 • The protective principle, according to which a State may regulate conduct of foreigners that could prejudice its most vital interests; however, while this concept is well established in international law, uncertainties remain as to its extent and the acts it covers • The universality principle, according to which all States may exercise jurisdiction over certain criminal activities, notably piracy and slavery, regardless of the place of perpetration and the nationality of victims or offenders 24. Against this background, it is generally assumed that extraterritorial sanctions are unlawful.11 The reason for this is basically that most extraterritorial sanctions cannot invoke any of the above-mentioned criteria.12 In particular, the effects doctrine, sometimes invoked by the United States as a justification for the implementation of extraterritorial measures, could be potentially legally warranted in only a very limited number of cases, given the cumulative requirements that the said effects (of the situation that has triggered the decision to impose sanctions) on the territory of the targeting State be direct, foreseeable and substantial. It also appears that extraterritorial sanctions cannot generally be justified as legitimate countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. 25. A number of negative reactions to the practice of extraterritorial sanctions have been expressed over time by United Nations organs, other international organizations and individual States, and are reflected in the academic literature. The assumption that extraterritorial sanctions are unlawful is shared by a vast number of countries.13 Since 1992, the General Assembly has annually voiced its condemnation of the extraterritorial reach of the embargo imposed on Cuba by the United States. 14 For its part, in 1996, the European Union adopted a so-called blocking statute, under which European Union companies are prohibited from complying with extraterritorial sanctions imposed by the United States. 15 The European Union has also expressed its position against extraterritorial sanctions in its own guidelines on “restrictive measures” as follows: “The EU will refrain from adopting legislative instruments having extra-territorial application in breach of international law. The EU has condemned the extraterritorial application of third country’s legislation imposing restrictive measures which purports to regulate the activities of natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the Member States of the European Union, as being in violation of international law”.16 26. A comprehensive study aimed at evaluating the practice of extraterritorial unilateral sanctions under international law would far exceed the scope of the present report. This remains a task for the future, preferably to be undertaken by the International Law Commission. Such a study would require a comprehensive enquiry into the existence, the content and the precise current legal status of any rule prohibiting recourse to extraterritorial sanctions in present-day international law. The study would also have to recapitulate all known critical reactions to extraterritorial sanctions at the United Nations level, but also those of regional organizations or individual States or those voiced in the 11 12 13 14 15 16 See C. Beaucillon, “Practice makes perfect, eventually? Unilateral State sanctions and the extraterritorial effects of national legislation”, in N. Ronzitti, ed., Coercive Diplomacy, Sanctions and International Law (Leiden/Boston, Brill/Nijhoff, 2016), pp. 103-126; and S. Emmenegger, “Extraterritorial economic sanctions and their foundation in international law”, Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 33 (2016), pp. 633-660. See M. Cosnard, “Les lois Helms-Burton et d’Amato-Kennedy”, pp. 36-50. In addition to the various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council condemning the use of extraterritorial sanctions, the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have firmly rejected this practice (see, for instance, Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization resolution RES/51/S 6). See also Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96”, referred to above. Canada, Japan and other countries appear to share the same views. See General Assembly resolution 47/19 and subsequent resolutions. Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96”. Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy” (15 June 2012), para. 52. 7