A/HRC/2/6 page 12 “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”. Hatred and hostility would appear to refer to very similar notions even though, unlike discrimination or violence, neither concept can be precisely defined. Both the Human Rights Committee and CERD have understood their respective terms to include a passive state of mind rather than a specific act. In other words, the proscribed result is the fact of harbouring hostility towards a target group and it is not essential that this state of mind be acted upon. 41. It is difficult to extract firm conclusions on the rules governing hate speech from the cases. From the perspective of international law, the question of what constitutes incitement to genocide or to other proscribed results recognized under hate speech provisions requires consideration of a number of issues, including intent, causation or nexus between the speech and the proscribed result, context, tone and truth. On the other hand, the recent cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda illustrate the conceptual and policy difficulties that arise from these definitional problems. B. The context of race and religion 42. The legal debate is complicated by the sensitivity that attaches to discussions of issues of race and religion. For example, heightened concern with racism is sometimes offered as an explanation for the broader scope of article 4(a) of CERD, which prohibits the mere dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred or superiority, regardless of any impact. In contrast, article 19, paragraph 3, of ICCPR, which encompasses incitement in other contexts, permits restrictions on freedom of expression only to the extent necessary to protect the public interest in question. 43. This point is illustrated by the Jersild case in which the European Court of Human Rights held that the airing of a television programme that included hate speech statements by racist extremists was protected speech because the producer’s intention was to generate public debate on the issue. It seems clear from the decision that the actions of the journalist would not fall within the scope of article 20, paragraph 2, of ICCPR, primarily because they did not constitute advocacy of hatred. The Court also noted that the context made it unlikely that the statements would have incited violence, discrimination or hostility. 44. Although the European Court held that its decision was compatible with ICERD, it is quite conceivable that Mr. Jersild’s conviction would have been compatible with that instrument because article 4(a) prohibits the mere dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred. CERD’s report to the General Assembly noted that some members welcomed this decision as the clearest statement yet, in any country, that the right to protection against racial discrimination took precedence over the right to freedom of expression. Other members thought that in such cases the facts needed to be considered in relation to both rights.35 45. With respect to religion, the general view is that the guarantee of freedom of expression protects even very strong criticism of religion.36 Free speech may not, however, protect statements whose goal is simply to promote hatred against particular religious adherents. In Giniewski, the European Court of Human Rights seemed to support this approach, holding that the impugned speech was not a gratuitous attack on religion but, rather, part of a clash of ideas (“débat d’idées”).37