A/HRC/30/48 9. While fought mostly by Syrians and largely contained within Syrian territory, the war is increasingly driven by international and regional powers, primarily in accordance with their respective geostrategic interests. Syrian stakeholders, on all sides of the conflict, have gradually lost control over the course of events due to a variety of external factors that have obscured the internal dimension of the war. As the war endures, it displays worrying signs of becoming internationalized. The competition among regional powers for influence has resulted, among other consequences, in an alarming exacerbation of the sectarian dimension, instigated by the intervention of foreign fighters and extremist clerics. 10. Government forces3 have struggled against mounting military pressure by antiGovernment armed groups, as well as Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS), successively losing strategic localities and military positions in several governorates. Unable to advance during most of their recent attacks in Aleppo and southern Dara’a, Government forces have also failed to prevent the collapse of their external defensive lines during offensives by ISIS and other armed groups in strategic areas such as eastern Homs and Idlib. 11. As recognized by President Bashar al-Assad in his July televised address, shortages in loyal manpower, combined with the proliferation of highly active fronts, have constrained Government forces’ ability to react simultaneously throughout the country. As a result, the Government has prioritized highly strategic areas such as Damascus, coastal governorates, and communication lines along the Lebanese borders, the only international borders they still control. Besides continuing aerial bombardments, Government forces relied heavily and regularly on Hezbollah and other foreign Shia militia. In particular, elite units including the Republican Guard and the 4th Division have been significantly affected by casualties and war attrition. 12. Anti-Government armed groups, ranging from Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliates to groups such as Ahrar Al-Sham, made important tactical gains along frontlines with Government forces in Idlib, Dara’a and Aleppo governorates. While intermittently fighting ISIS and its allies in northern Aleppo countryside and southern Damascus, they have increasingly collaborated with Jabhat Al-Nusra and groups such as Ansar Al-Deen and Jund Al-Aqsa, apparently prioritizing present operational necessities over ideological and political divergences.4 13. Significant improvements in coordination and access to logistical support have contributed to enhanced overall operational performance, leading to fresh advances. Divisions over ideology and politics, as well as infighting over resources and territory, persist and may continue to undermine unity and coherence within their ranks in the future. 14. Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Syrian affiliate of Al-Qaida, has played a key role during armed groups’ recent gains in Idlib, where it regularly operates in close proximity with groups from different ideological backgrounds. Composed mainly of Syrian militants – in contrast to ISIS – it has reinforced its hold on large parts of Idlib governorate, devolving resources and efforts on local governance. With a particular focus on putting security and 3 4 4 The term “Government forces”, unless specified otherwise, includes the Syrian Armed Forces, intelligence forces and associated foreign and local militias, including Hezbollah, the shabbiha, popular committees and National Defence Forces. While in some Syrian governorates, Jabhat Al-Nusra has undertaken major operations in concert with anti-Government armed groups, these coalitions generally arise out of operational necessity rather than genuine ideological engagement. In all references to Jabhat Al-Nusra in this report, the Commission continues to regard the group as a terrorist entity as designated by Security Council resolution 2170 (2014).