A/HRC/16/51 language, but does not reduce the requirement to prove both a subjective intention to incite as well as an objective danger that a terrorist act will be committed. 31. Thus, in the implementation of article 5 of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, the offence of incitement to terrorism (a) must be limited to the incitement to conduct that is truly terrorist in nature, as properly defined pursuant to practice 7 above; (b) must restrict the freedom of expression no more than is necessary for the protection of national security, public order and safety or public health or morals;55 (c) must be prescribed by law in precise language, including by avoiding reference to vague terms such as “glorifying” or “promoting” terrorism;56 (d) must include an actual (objective) risk that the act incited will be committed;57 (e) should expressly refer to two elements of intent, namely intent to communicate a message and intent that this message incite the commission of a terrorist act;58 and (f) should preserve the application of legal defences or principles leading to the exclusion of criminal liability by referring to “unlawful” incitement to terrorism.59 32. The Special Rapporteur formulates the model offence of incitement to terrorism below as a best practice in the fight against terrorism: Practice 8. Model offence of incitement to terrorism It is an offence to intentionally and unlawfully distribute or otherwise make available a message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not expressly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed. H. Listing of terrorist entities 33. States take different approaches to the designation of, and criminalization of conduct linked to, terrorist groups. Many countries include a mechanism by which entities that are listed in the Consolidated List of the United Nations are also automatically listed by the domestic law of the country.60 The Special Rapporteur has on several occasions expressed the view that, as long as there is no independent review of listings at the level of the United Nations, there must be access to domestic judicial review of any domestic implementing measures pertaining to persons on the Consolidated List.61 Even with the enhanced procedures for listing at the level of the United Nations, and the appointment of an Ombudsperson, the Special Rapporteur remains concerned about procedural inadequacies 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19 (3). See fact sheet No. 32, op. cit., p. 28, and the joint declaration of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media and the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, 21 December 2005. A/61/267, para. 28; Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (E/CN.4/1996/39, annex), principle 6. A/61/267, para. 30. Council of Europe, Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, paras. 81-83. Australia, Charter of the United Nations Act, 1945, sect.18 (1), combined with associated regulations; Canada, United National Al-Qaida and Taliban Regulations, 1999. See A/61/267, paras. 9-41, A/HRC/4/26/Add.3, para. 20, A/HRC/6/17/Add.2, para. 72, and A/63/223, paras. 16 and 45 (a).