A/HRC/16/23 18. During the reporting period the Nepal Police remained unwilling to proceed with criminal investigations involving the Army, the Armed Police Force, members of the Maoist army or its own members as alleged perpetrators. Police officers consistently refer to the need for policy decisions at the highest level, refusing to proceed with investigations despite a clear legal process to be followed. Similarly, public prosecutors, responsible for advising the police on investigations and presenting cases to the courts, frequently fail to properly utilize established procedures to promote the proper conduct of investigations. 4. Withdrawal of criminal cases, pardon and clemency 19. The fact that principles of accountability and justice are increasingly subordinated to political imperatives is further illustrated by the large number of criminal cases withdrawn by the Government in recent years under pressure from various political parties and ethnic groups. 20. This practice began in 2008 with the initial justification that withdrawing “politically motivated” cases was required by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, it has since expanded to cases occurring after the conflict, with political parties, armed groups and indigenous and ethnic groups demanding that criminal cases against their supporters be withdrawn. Successive governments have agreed to withdraw cases under such pressure, including some carrying serious charges such as murder and rape, and have made proactive offers of amnesties while conducting negotiations with armed groups in the Terai. The practice has continued despite a Supreme Court interim order in 2008 directing the suspension of further withdrawals. 21. The practice encourages political interference in the rule of law, demoralizing police officials, prosecutors and judges working on such cases, contributing to public insecurity by allowing alleged criminals to escape prosecution, and further eroding public confidence in law and order institutions and the Government. It is also of concern that the Constituent Assembly has proposed a provision for the new Constitution allowing the President to grant pardons without specifically excluding clemency for persons who have committed serious human rights violations. The Government reports that the new draft criminal procedure code contains a number of restrictions in relation to withdrawal of cases. 5. Lack of an effective oversight mechanism 22. In countries emerging from conflict, reforming national security institutions is an important step in the transition to lasting peace and democracy, and a vital element in this regard is the establishment of credible and effective oversight mechanisms. However, the existing oversight mechanisms and processes in Nepal do little to challenge impunity. 23. In its summary of concerns on alleged extrajudicial killings perpetrated by security forces (see para. 8 above), OHCHR-Nepal found that committees and special courts formed to inquire into allegations often appeared to serve as instruments to cover up incidents. For example in June 2009, following a fatal shooting by a police officer in Dhanusha district, rather than investigating the incident in application of criminal law procedures, the police established a special court which merely imposed a financial disciplinary penalty on the accused police official. 24. The Ministry of Home Affairs also regularly establishes commissions of inquiry to investigate important incidents involving police personnel. However, these commissions have proven to be flawed on a number of levels: their members are often from the same police forces as those under investigation, creating significant conflicts of interest; the work of such commissions is not transparent; and their terms of reference and final reports are generally not made public. Similarly, a provision in the Army Act provides for court martial procedures that in effect prevent the further prosecution of human rights violations. 7