A/HRC/28/83 31. Following these events and since the Algiers talks, the number of armed clashes has increased in northern Mali among the different members of the armed coalitions aligned with the two main parties in the peace process. 32. A typical example of this trend was the violent battle that took place near Tabankort in the Gao region, on 10 July 2014, between the alliance of pro-independence groups MNLA, HCUA and MAA, and the so-called loyalist Arab and Tuareg groups, including an MAA faction close to the Government, Tuareg soldiers from the Imghad tribe as well as members of CMFPR. Such factional fighting took place on 20 July in Tarkint, in cercle of Bourem, between MAA and MNLA factions. 33. Due to the resurgence of localized fighting, on 24 July, at the end of the first round of the Algiers talks, both parties set up a joint commission to be deployed in northern Mali with the assistance of MINUSMA so as to achieve a lasting cessation of hostilities between MNLA and MAA and factions of the same ethnic groups allied to the Government. 34. In spite of these many challenges, the Government has made progress in forging a national vision for the reform of the security sector. For example, on 14 August 2014, the Independent Expert was pleased to hear that a national council for the reform of the security sector had been established by presidential decree. The reform, which is part of the agenda for peace in Mali, will be essential for the modernization of its national defence and security forces. C. The ongoing challenge of the fight against impunity 35. The inauguration of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, on 4 September 2014, ended a 16-month transitional period of disturbances, marked by the coup d’état of 22 March 2012 and the state of emergency declared between January and July 2013. 36. The Transitional Government gained notoriety through its contradictory actions in the fight against impunity. It submitted information relating to international crimes committed during the crisis in Mali to the International Criminal Court, yet it approved the promotion to general of the instigator of the coup d’état, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who was suspected of direct involvement in committing those crimes. 37. Another legal loophole in the fight against impunity is article 18 of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, under which the parties commit to take appropriate confidence-building measures to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement and to release those detained in connection with the armed conflict. 38. The Malian Constitution of 1992, which is still in force, provides for an independent judiciary; but the judiciary is often subject to interference from the executive and corruption is commonplace. 39. In his report of March 2014, the Independent Expert praised the considerable efforts made by the Malian judiciary, which had demonstrated great courage and a certain independence by conducting investigations into serious crimes committed in the south of the country during the crisis, despite the modest logistical and material resources provided by the Government. 40 However, the Independent Expert drew attention to the fact that little or no headway had been made so far in the investigations into the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by all the belligerents in the north of the country. 41. This contrast has remained apparent since, as shown by the progress made in the investigation of the case of the missing “red beret” soldiers and the mutiny of September 2013; both events centred on the Kati military barracks, the headquarters of those involved 8 GE.15-00252