A/HRC/44/47/Add.1 103. The procedure for the selection of Chairs, deputy Chairs and judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court should be reviewed in order to reduce the politicization of judicial appointments. Should the Senate (Oliy Majlis) retain the power to formally appoint judges, the appointment should be made on a transparent process and on the basis of a proposal of the Supreme Judicial Council that the parliament follows in practice. Security of tenure 104. The system of two temporary appointments before achieving a lifelong appointment should be reconsidered, since it exposes judges to the risk of undue pressure and interferences during the first 15 years in office. While moving towards life appointment, the Special Rapporteur recommends limiting temporary appointments to a single initial term of office, possibly for 10 years. 105. The criteria set out in article 22 of the Law on the Supreme Judicial Council for the selection of judges for a new term and other judicial positions should be eliminated because they risk exposing judges to undue interferences in their judicial activity. In particular, the number of acquittals should never be used as an indicator for the evaluation of judges. To diminish pressure on judges to avoid acquittals, a change in the system of their professional evaluation is strongly recommended. 106. The professional evaluation of judges should be based on a clear and transparent procedure previously established by law. It should focus upon the judge’s skills, including professional competence, personal competence, social competence and, for possible promotion to an administrative position, competence to lead. Judges should be heard and informed about the outcome of the evaluation, with opportunities for review on appeal. Court Chairs 107. In accordance with international standards, the mandate of court Chairs should be limited to representative and administrative functions. They should not be involved in judicial selection or in disciplinary proceedings against judges. The discretionary powers entrusted to court Chairs in relation to judges’ salaries and bonuses should be eliminated. 108. In order to minimize the risk of political interference with the work of the courts, the power to elect court Chairs should be vested in a judicial authority (either the Supreme Judicial Council or the conference of judges sitting in the court). Disciplinary proceedings 109. Judges should only be subject to disciplinary proceedings in the cases expressly provided for by law and in accordance with a fair and appropriate procedure before a court or a similar independent body entrusted with this task. 110. Judges should only be subject to disciplinary proceedings in cases of alleged professional misconduct that are gross and inexcusable and at risk of compromising the independence and authority of the judiciary. Disciplinary responsibility of judges should not extend to the content of their decisions. 111. The power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges should only be vested in the Supreme Judicial Council. In order to minimize the threat to judicial independence arising from the pyramidal structure of the justice system, court Chairs may file a complaint to the body that is competent to receive complaints and conduct disciplinary investigations, but should not have the power to either initiate or adopt a disciplinary measure. 112. In order to avoid excessive concentration of power in one body, judicial qualification boards should not play any role in disciplinary proceedings against judges. For the same reason, it would be preferable that the competence to hear the case and adopt a decision on disciplinary measures be attributed to a different independent body not subject to the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council. Such a 18