A/HRC/16/42 total population of Timor-Leste) fled their land and homes; 65 IDP camps and transitional shelters were set up; secondary occupants inhabited many of the abandoned properties; an estimated 6,000 houses in Dili were destroyed or severely damaged; and in rural areas there were cases of entire villages being burned down30 . 27. This subsequent wave of violence and dispossessions prompted a well-considered and ambitious set of remedial actions in the form of a National Recovery Strategy (NRS) called Hamutuk Hari’I Futuru (Together Building the Future) launched in December 2007. The five pillars of this strategy focused on: IDP return and resettlement; establishing a social security system for the most vulnerable groups in society; addressing security issues including working with communities to identify and address sources of conflict; creating livelihood opportunities through job generation schemes; and building trust within communities and between the people and the government. However, various aspects of the strategy were not implemented. For example the range of options that was initially stated to be available to returning IDPs was drastically cut – essentially limited to the mass payout of cash compensation amounts. Ultimately these payments, combined with a reconciliation and dialogue process (discussed below), constituted the extent of the programme implemented to return or resettle IDPs and reconstruct housing. As of July 2010 payments were still being made and in total there had been approximately 17,000 recipient households 31. Under the circumstances of potential further disturbances and lack of State capacity there were good arguments for giving people the funds with which to address their own housing and immediate livelihood needs. The approach also allowed for individually tailored solutions for housing and livelihood restoration. However there were a number of problems from a human rights perspective, including the following: (a) most payments went to male heads of households, with no measures in place to ensure that the funds would be spent on housing for the whole family; (b) families under severe financial stress could be under pressure to use the cash payments to cover more urgent, short-term expenses instead of housing; (c) through resorting to cash payments, the State missed an important opportunity to channel funds towards the provision of properly serviced sites for housing. 28. An even more serious concern was the fact that the NRS had to be implemented in the ongoing absence of a legal framework on land and property ownership and dispute resolution, in spite of many calls for action and proposals on establishing such a framework in order to bring certainty in a situation of profound tenure insecurity. Despite some commendable efforts to deal with the land tenure puzzle by a number of dedicated Timorese government officials and international advisors, visible progress towards such certainty only started during 2008. A “Decree on the Cadastre” was passed in July 2008, which authorized the restructured National Directorate for Land, Property and Cadastral Services and the Ita Nia Rai programme to undertake land tenure data collection around the country; and a draft Transitional Land Law was approved by the Council of Ministers on 10 March 2010 and as of September 2010 awaits consideration by Parliament. 29. Another significant post-conflict case is Cambodia, a country still recovering from the destructiveness of the Khmer Rouge era. Among other things, the Khmer Rouge systematically destroyed the prior land tenure system, forcibly evicted millions of people from their homes (including emptying the city of Phnom Penh), and destroyed land ownership records. Despite the passage of new land laws, weaknesses in the rule of law and lack of institutional capacity have allowed a culture of corruption and have facilitated landgrabbing, often by elites at the expense of the poor. A recent claim to the World Bank Inspection Panel, brought on behalf of people threatened with eviction from their homes 30 31 10 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2009. “Timor-Leste: IDPs have returned home, but the challenge of reintegration is just beginning”, Norwegian Refugee Council, 9 December 2009, Geneva, p. 3. E-mail communication from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, Timor Leste, 20 July 2010.