A/HRC/16/42 38. In spite of these challenges, it is very important to ensure that time and opportunity are made for gathering of information, analysis and assessment of policy choices; and for intensive consultation with, and the involvement of, those affected. People directly affected by conflicts and crises are not mere helpless victims. They are invariably the first people “on the scene” and are often the first to take some form of action. In Honduras following the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch the immediate post-disaster processes of rescue, relief and stabilization were characterized by remarkable personal determination and great displays of social solidarity, with private and public buildings opening their doors to the displaced and homeless. Communities in different parts of the country self-organized and developed their own survival strategies. Citizens joined neighbourhood or community solidarity groups, which, because of insufficient official assistance and their isolation, frequently carried out emergency tasks on their own initiative37. Some of the most basic emergency interventions implemented included search and rescue operations, provision of temporary shelter, sanitation programmes such as the disposal of human and animal remains, and the distribution of water, food, blankets, and domestic items. This was in contrast to the Government’s response to the crisis which included immediate centralization of State power and, two days later, the announcement that plans to draft a national plan for reconstruction had been initiated, conducted without transparency in a secretive fashion. 39. Research conducted by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) and the ProVention Consortium in the wake of the 2005 South Asia earthquake found “accumulated evidence that people affected by disasters want to participate fully in the response, even if this means a slower implementation process. However, disbursement pressure – the need to get money out of the door – has in the past partly determined response mechanis38.”While emphasizing the importance of participation, the study also cautions: “When considering communities […] it is important to remember: not to romanticise the coping capacities and resilience of local people and communities – they often face insurmountable difficulties when responding to major disasters; that often ‘communities’, particularly in areas of high inequality, are made up of different interest groups, and include marginalised groups who may well have difficulty getting their views represented; cultural ‘norms’ may also, for example, work against women’s rights39.” 40. Ways need to be found around such obstacles, for at the heart of the matter lie the issues of ownership and accountability. In his 2006 report on lessons learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery found that “It is a false trade-off to sacrifice local ownership for speed if that means short-circuiting the rights of affected populations to be informed in a timely manner about their choices, the assistance available to them, and any delays that are being experienced. The other side of this coin, of course, is accountability to the families and communities our recovery efforts are serving. Typically, demands for accountability come loudest from donors – private and institutional – and implementing agencies are more likely to focus on this kind of upward accountability. Too often, the less organized voices of the survivors are not heard, and this equally vital downward accountability is given secondpriority at best. This is unfortunate, as a disaster’s survivors are best placed to design the 37 38 39 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Honduras: Assessment of the Damage Caused by Hurricane Mitch, 1998. Implications for Economic and Social Development and for the Environment”, LC/MEX/L.367, 14 April 1999, p.12. T. Beck, “South Asia Earthquake 2005”, ProVention Consortium and ALNAP briefing paper, p.2. Ibid.p.2. 13