A/HRC/16/42 May 2010 some 51 per cent of the rural population was located in imidugudu, a remarkably rapid increase from 22 per cent in 2008, and well on the way to the target for its Vision2020 objective of 70 per cent by 2014 54 . The long-term social consequences of these achievements are still unclear. In adopting and implementing the policy there has been a blurring of humanitarian, development and “security” or population control agendas, in the absence of genuine consultation, negotiation and reconciliation. This, coupled with a lack of sufficient pro-poor urban settlement practices, may lead to future problems. D. Institutional coordination, phasing and the promotion of the right to adequate housing 50. In high-profile or “complex emergency” 55 cases, conflicts and disasters elicit international interventions and massive relief responses from a variety of institutions and States. In recent years, given the overwhelming scale, frequency and complexity of unfolding crises, there have been signs of a creeping sense of donor fatigue56 . 51. In response to serious problems experienced in the past, the humanitarian response system has since the 1990s undergone a process of reform to reduce the fragmentation of efforts which had beset its earlier engagements and been responsible for numerous contradictions and tensions. This has produced a much stronger co-ordination framework also involving bilateral institutions, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and NGOs. 52. The process started in 1991 with General Assembly Resolution 46/182 designed to “strengthen the United Nations response to complex emergencies and natural disasters” as well as “aiming at improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field”. Crises in subsequent years (above all the Rwanda genocide in 1994 where the international community was explicitly faulted for inability to predict, prevent and respond) accelerated the pace of reform. The United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) was established in 1998, as a department of the United Nations Secretariat with the mandate of co-ordinating humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. It merged all humanitarian functions of the United Nations until then performed by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs under a single United Nations Focal Point, the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (ERC). General Assembly Resolution 46/182 further established important inter-agency mechanisms and operational tools. These include: the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), gathering all humanitarian partners from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the World Bank, the Red Cross and the main international NGOs to function as an inter-agency decision-making body in response to complex emergencies; and, structured in clusters and phases related to specific funds and plans of action: the Flash Appeal (FA), the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). 53. In spite of these advances, a number of grey areas and fault lines remain, as does the need for further focusing on better systemic arrangements for the integration of human rights perspectives in disaster response. Post-conflict and post-disaster responses remain plagued by disconnections between various phases of activity. Many bilateral donors called 54 55 56 Data provided by Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs, 28 June 2010. “Complex emergencies” occur where different natural and/or human crises blend and mutually reinforce each other. See for example: “Donor fatigue hits UN aid to Sudan”, BBC, 19 February 1998; “U.N. battles donor fatigue for funds for Pakistan”, Reuters, 17 August 2010. 17